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Abstract
This dissertation examines the importance of equity structure choice by 
management in the context of IPOs. Specifically, it identifies and presents some 
managerial motives for a dual-class equity structure at the time of IPO that derive 
from governance and market microstructure considerations, and analyzes the effects 
of dual-class common stock structures (versus single voting class common stock) and 
the distribution of voting power on initial underpricing, subsequent after-market 
pricing, long-run firm performance, insider trading, firm liquidity and related 
market microstructure issues.
To assess underpricing and performance differences that are due to the firm’s 
ownership structure, a control sample of single-class IPOs that is matched to the 
dual-class by exchange, firm size, industry, and time of offering is created. For the 
sample of all dual-class IPOs in the 1980s, the study finds no statistically significant 
abnormal long-run performance over a three year horizon. This stands in sharp 
contrast to Ritter’s [1991] finding of significant IPO underperformance in the three 
years after going public. Upon comparing dual-class and control group performance 
across different exchanges, the study finds that for both NYSE/AMEX and 
NASDAQ, single-class IPOs significantly underperform dual-class IPOs in stock- 
price performance during the three years following the offering. The 
unueiperformance is not sensitive to the choice of benchmark used to adjust for 
market movements, or to the exchange on which the shares trade. Additionally, 
using various accounting measures of operating performance, the study finds that
over three years of trading on the market dual-class IPOs on average are twice as 
profitable as single-class IPOs.
Furthermore, a dual-class structure is found to reduce the adverse selection 
problem facing uninformed traders. Not only do the dual-class IPOs (relative to 
single-class) experience significantly lesser underpricing at the time of IPO, but also 
appear to enjoy improved liquidity during the 250 trading days following the IPO. 
The dual-class firms have significantly smaller bid-ask spreads, trade-to-trade price 
volatility, average trade size, and larger average volume turnover ratio.
x
Chapter 1 
Introduction
This study presents new evidence pertaining to dual-class and single-class initial 
public offerings (IPOs), and extends the literature on corporate governance and market 
microstructure. Issues addressed herein relate to the choice of a dual-class equity 
structure by some IPOs in contrast to a single-class structure by most other IPOs and 
the effect of such choice on firm value, on post-IPO performance, on extent of insider 
trading, and on related market microstructure issues. The dual-class firms are unique 
in that the two classes of common stock have almost identical cash-flow claims but 
differential voting rights. Moreover, only the inferior voting stock is issued in the IPO 
and publicly traded while the superior voting stock (and along with it firm control) is 
retained almost entirely by the owners/founders at the time of going public thereby 
concentrating control in their hands. The study addresses the question of whether the 
issuing firms benefit, ceteris paribus, from concentrating control in such a way.
The study analyzes these firms’ characteristics in order to provide new insights, 
and empirically examines existing theories that try to explain a dual-class capital 
structure choice by management. It differs from earlier studies on dual-class firms in 
several respects. While earlier studies dealt with recapitalizations, this study analyzes 
dual-class IPOs. In a dual-class IPO, the firm’s owners can design a governance 
structure for the firm prior to taking it public. Hence, all potential transfer of wealth 
effects resulting from a change to the new control structure occur prior to the IPO. 
Accordingly, the inferior voting stock receives its fair market value at the time of going
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public. In contrast to analyses of recapitalizations, the results in this study are not 
sensitive to potential wealth expropriations from holders of inferior voting shares to 
holders o f superior voting shares. Furthermore, the adverse selection problem is higher 
for IPOs than for seasoned equity due to lack of public trading history.
The study identifies and explains managerial motives for a dual-class equity 
structure in the case of IPOs. In particular, it analyzes the effects o f dual-class 
common stock structures (versus ordinary or single voting class common stock) and the 
distribution of voting power on initial underpricing and post-IPO firm performance 
(both stock price and operating). Furthermore, it examines the effects of dual versus 
single classes of common stock upon various measures of liquidity, extent of insider 
trading, and upon the adverse information component of the bid-ask spread. To get 
first-hand information on some reasons that motivated the founders of the dual-class 
IPOs to adopt a dual-class equity structure at the time of going public, the CEOs/CFOs 
were contacted for an opinion (Some excerpts are contained in Appendix D). Various 
studies have examined the underpricing and long-run performance of IPOs. However, 
no study has examined the underpricing, long-run performance, or market 
microstructure characteristics of dual-class IPOs where control is concentrated in the 
hands of management.
The study covers a relatively recent time period over which much controversy 
has arisen with respect to dual-class recapitalization. The dual-class IPO sample 
comprises firms that went public in and after 1984 when the NYSE imposed a 
moratorium on the delisting of companies with a dual-class equity structure. The issue
of whether or not to allow firms to adopt a dual-class equity structure is still being 
decided by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC has proposed 
Rule 19c-4 which permits firms to recapitalize with a dual-class equity structure as long 
as it does not diminish the voting power of existing shareholders. In effect, a firm can 
issue a new class of stock through a public offering, but with lower voting rights. In 
anticipation, this could lead some owner-managers desiring to take their firms public 
to adopt a dual-class equity structure upfront at the time of IPO, rather than have to 
deal with the legal intricacies o f the aforementioned SEC rule upon recapitalization 
later. Furthermore, by doing this they suffer from smaller dilution of firm control.
The study documents net benefits to a dual-class equity structure in the case of 
IPOs. In particular, the shares o f dual-class firms experience significantly lower first- 
day underpricing relative to those of single-class firms. Within the framework of 
models elaborated by Rock [1986] and Beatty and Ritter [1986], lower underpricing is 
consistent with a reduced adverse selection problem at the time of IPO. The dual-class 
shares also significantly outperform shares of single-class firms in the three years 
following the IPO. Dual-class shares do not significantly underperform the market, 
which stands in sharp contrast to Ritter’s [1991] finding of significant IPO long-run 
underperformance. This basic conclusion is not sensitive to the exchange where the 
shares trade or to the method used to adjust for market movements. Additionally, 
various accounting measures of operating performance show the dual-class IPOs to be 
on average twice as profitable as their single-class counterparts at the end of three years 
on the market. The founders of dual-class firms retain at least 49% of the cash-flow
claim while diluting the firm on average by 27.21% and retaining more than 68% of 
the voting control, and are thereby subject to the ex-post wealth consequences of their 
own decisions.
The study further examines net benefits to a dual-class equity structure for IPOs 
that derive from market microstructure considerations. Previous research on dual-class 
common stock has focused primarily upon issues related to managerial control (See 
Moyer, Rao and Sisneros [1992] for a recent review). Here, the study attempts to test 
the hypothesis that a dual-class voting structure for the firm’s ownership may help to 
mitigate the adverse selection problem facing uninformed traders at the time of going 
public. This would, ceteris paribus, improve the liquidity and increase the value of the 
firm’s stock.
The study finds significant differences in the microstructure characteristics of 
the two samples. It further finds that for both samples, several microstructure variables 
(e.g. quoted spread, trading volume, trade-to-trade price volatility, adverse information 
component o f the spread) change significantly during the seasoning period. In support 
of the aforementioned hypothesis, the study finds that a dual-class equity structure for 
IPOs results in significant mitigation of the adverse selection problem facing 
uninformed traders at the time of going public. Over the entire 250 day aftermarket 
trading period examined, the dual-class IPOs experience significantly smaller quoted 
relative and effective spreads, lower trade-to-trade price volatility, smaller average trade 
size (number of shares) and higher average turnover ratio (volume/shares outstanding 
and publicly traded) relative to the single-class IPOs. These measures strongly suggest
improved liquidity and consequently increased firm value. The differences in liquidity 
measures persist and remain significant from the first to the last trading day within the 
sample study period, irrespective of the frequency used for aggregating the data (daily, 
weekly, quarterly, or overall).
The overall evidence together with comments obtained from CEOs suggest that 
a dual-class capital structure in the case of IPOs is motivated by financing and 
diversification constraints of owner-managers with long-term vested interests in their 
firms rather than concentration o f control as an anti-takeover device in the event of poor 
firm-performance. Additionally, a dual-class equity structure serves to mitigate the 
adverse selection problem facing uninformed traders and results, ceteris paribus, in 
reduced underpricing, improved operating performance, improved liquidity, and 
increased value of the firm’s stock. A dual-class equity structure enables the 
owners/founders to successfully pursue at least five motives simultaneously: 1) raise 
additional capital for new projects, 2) effectively diversify personal wealth, 3) retain 
majority control and an active role in the very firms they have founded, even after 
subsequent offerings1, 4) pursue long-term interests rather than short-term profits, and 
5) ward off any unsolicited external interference to enable the firm to stabilize itself in 
a new operating and legal environment after going public. In particular, a dual-class 
framework provides increased incentives for managers to invest in organization-specific
'If  a firm makes subsequent offerings, both the cash-flow claim and the voting control of the owner- 
managers gets diluted. However, due to a dual-class equity structure, it is possible for the owner- 
managers to dilute their cash-flow claim significantly, and yet dilute their voting control only by a small 
amount so that they still effectively retain control.
human capital since the likelihood that returns to such investment will be expropriated 
is considerably reduced.
The tests in the study are carried out using three samples o f firms trading on the 
NASDAQ, AMEX, and NYSE markets over the period 1984-1990: 1) 98 dual-class 
IPOs, 2) 1270 single-class (ordinary) IPOs, and 3) a control group o f 98 single-class 
IPOs matched to the dual-class sample by exchange, offer date, industry, and firm size. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents related 
research on underpricing and the long-run performance of IPOs, dual-class 
recapitalizations and the resultant shareholder wealth effects, and the market 
microstructure characteristics o f IPOs. The major hypotheses tested in the study are 
discussed in Chapter 3. The data collection process, methodology and design for 
carrying out the tests, description of the sample firms, and summary statistics are 
outlined in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents empirical results on firm underpricing, long- 
run performance, and market microstructure characteristics o f dual and single-class 
IPOs. Concluding remarks and a brief summary appear in Chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Initial Public Offerings and Dual-Class Equity Structures - Related Research
2.1. Introduction
Through the years and especially during the 1980s, many firms created a second 
class of common stock with limited voting rights. The effects of such managerial 
choice on firm underpricing, long-run firm performance, firm value, insider trading, 
and related market microstructure issues are potentially interesting. Past research on 
IPOs has discussed and documented the underpricing and long-run underperformance 
phenomena, but has not provided any insight on corporate governance or market 
microstructure issues related to IPOs with dual-class equity structures. Furthermore, 
previous research on recapitalizations by Jarrell and Poulsen [1988], Partch [1987], 
Sisneros [1989], Cornett and Vetsuypens [1989], Moyer and Sisneros [1991], and 
Mikkelson and Partch [1992] has found mixed evidence on the wealth effects of the 
adoption of dual-class capital structures. Most firms in their samples (with the 
exception of Sisneros, and Moyer and Sisneros), however, recapitalized and adopted 
a dual-class capital structure after the IPO. In contrast, this study is interested in 
privately held firms that have adopted a dual-class capital structure and then issued the 
diminished voting shares in an IPO. The sample o f IPOs used in this study is not 
sensitive to a potential wealth expropriation from holders of inferior-voting shares. In 
contrast, some shareholders may gain at the expense of others in later conversion to a 
dual-class structure.2 Furthermore, the adverse selection problem facing investors, the
2Ruback [1988] shows that common-stock shareholders may be coerced into converting their holdings 
into inferior-voting shares to their own detriment.
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trading and legal environments, and motivations for a dual-class equity structure may 
be potentially different for IPOs compared to those for seasoned firms.
2.2. The IPO Market
2.2.1 Introduction
Previous IPO research has primarily focussed on three anomalies: (1) short-run 
underpricing o f IPOs, (2) the "hot issue" market phenomenon, and (3) the long-run 
underperformance of IPOs. Following Ibbotson’s [1975] pioneering paper, extensive 
work has been done to document these anomalies and to offer hypotheses to explain 
them. The IPO aftermarket is potentially interesting since a firm enters a new 
operating and legal environment very different from that when it is private.
2.2.2 Intitial Underpricing
Ibbotson [1975], Ibbotson and Jaffe [1975], and Ritter [1984] document that 
IPOs experience an average underpricing of 15%, and that the amount of underpricing 
varies substantially over time and across industries. Numerous theories of underpricing 
have been offered. Some theories have focussed on informational asymmetries at the 
time of the IPO, while others rely on the reputational capital of underwriters as a 
disciplinary mechanism. However, they generally differ with respect to the assumed 
information structure.
The IPO market is characterized typically by problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard as first described by Akerlof [1970] in his "lemons" problem. In the 
absence of any mechanisms that help distinguish between bad versus good projects, 
there exists a pooling equilibrium (instead of a separating equilibrium) for all projects
in terms of prices. Eventually, due to informational asymmetries the bad drive out the 
good and markets collapse. In the context of the IPO market and within the framework 
of the securities issuance literature, some researchers have proposed models using 
signaling arguments and reputational capital as disciplinary mechanisms that would help 
reduce the adverse selection problem and certify the quality of firm projects (see Leland 
and Pyle [1977], Ross [1977], Myers and Majluf [1984], Miller and Rock [1985], and 
Titman and Trueman [1986]).
Specifically, Baron and Holstrom’s [1980] and Baron’s [1982] models of 
underpricing assume investment bankers have an informational advantage over issuers, 
such that the latter transfer the pricing decision to the former who offer the securities 
at a discount as compensation for the use of their superior information. In the process, 
the investment bankers are able to enhance client relationships without spending too 
much marketing effort. Ritter [1984] and Chalk and Peavy [1987] attribute 
underpricing to the use of monopsony power by investment bankers.
On the other hand, Rock [1986] attributes underpricing to informational 
asymmetries between informed and uninformed investors. He argues that IPOs are 
underpriced by underwriters to compensate uninformed investors for the "winners’ 
curse" problem they face, thus ensuring uninformed participation in the IPO market. 
Informed investors subscribe only to those issues about which they have favorable 
information. Beatty and Ritter [1986] extend Rock’s model and show that expected 
underpricing increases with the ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the IPO. Moreover, 
Beatty and Ritter [1986], Booth and Smith [1986], and Carter and Manaster [1990]
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develop models where underwriter reputation is used as a signal to certify firm quality, 
thereby reducing the adverse selection problem and consequently the need for 
underpricing.
Tinic [1988] presents evidence to support the view that underpricing serves as 
an efficient insurance mechanism against potential legal liabilities o f issuers. Allen and 
Faulhaber [1989], Welch [1989], and Grinblatt and Hwang [1989] view underpricing 
as a signal of firm quality. The issuing firms have superior information about their 
value, and good firms are willing to underprice because they are able to recoup the 
underpricing loss in subsequent offerings. Slovin and Young [1990], James and Weir 
[1990], and Megginson and Weiss [1991] document how the reputational capital of 
commercial banks and venture capitalists helps certify firm quality and thereby reduces 
the need for underpricing.
Benveniste and Spindt [1989] develop a model where firms use underpricing to 
acquire information from their regular clients who are assumed to possess superior 
information relative to all others. The underwriters, who control both price and 
allocation of the IPO, conduct a road-show during which they induce regular investors 
through greater underpricing to truthfully reveal their private information. 
Consequently hot issues are subject to greater underpricing relative to cold issues since 
the underpricing constitutes a reward to the informed investors for revealing their 
information. Hanley [1993] finds evidence for this hypothesis whereby the issues for 
which the underwriters revise the offer price and offer quantity (number of shares)
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upward from the midpoints of the filing ranges respectively, are deemed to be hot and 
are consequently more underpriced.
Finally, Muscarella and Vetsuypens [1989] find that investment banks that went 
public were underpriced as well. This evidence serves to contradict the various 
aforementioned explanations for underpricing that employ the reputational capital of 
underwriters as a disciplinary mechanism to reduce the adverse selection problem and 
underpricing.
2.2.3 Long-Run Performance
In contrast 10 the overwhelming volume of underpricing literature, relatively few 
studies have examined the long-run aftermarket performance of IPOs. With the 
exception of Buser and Chan [1987], all studies which examine the long-run 
performance of IPOs (Stoll and Curley [1970], Ibbotson [1975], Ritter [1984], 
Aggarwal and Rivoli [1990], and Ritter [1991]) find evidence of significantly negative 
aftermarket performance (excluding the initial day return). Ritter [1984] examines the 
aftermarket behavior of natural resource stocks from September 1981 to August 1982 
and finds a "hot market" for these issues. He posits an initial speculative bubble in 
trading as a result of which the aftermarket returns for the sample of IPOs 
underperformed an index of seasoned natural resource stocks by 15%. Aggarwal and 
Rivoli [1990] find that for their sample of 1598 IPOs over the period 1977-1987, 
investors who purchased at the closing price on day 1 in the aftermarket and held until 
day 250 earned significantly negative returns of -13.73%. Finally, Ritter [1991] 
documents long-run underperformance of 1526 IPOs, issued between 1975 and 1984,
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during their first three years on the market. He finds that they underperformed the 
market as well as a sample, o f matching firms after three years of trading. He 
concludes that his findings and methodology leave several issues unresolved, indicating 
a need for alternative explanations for the underperformance.
Aggarwal and Rivoli [1990] as well as Ritter [1991] posit that the IPO market 
may be subject to mean reverting fads. Here, a fad is defined as a temporary 
overvaluation caused by over-optimism on the part of investors. Aggarwal and Rivoli 
[1990] consider the IPO market a good candidate for the presence of fads for several 
reasons: (1) the intrinsic value o f IPOs is difficult to estimate and is shrouded in great 
uncertainty; (2) IPOs may be associated with higher risk and higher levels of noise 
trading, some forms of which result from expectations that do not conform to standard 
rationality assumptions such as overoptimism; and (3) IPO investors may be more 
speculative than other investors, and more speculation may lead to higher levels of price 
volatility.
2.2.4 Market Microstructure
The only microstructure study on IPOs is that by Hegde and Miller [1989], who 
upon studying IPOs during 1983-84, report that quoted percentage spreads are on 
average three-fourths as large as those for seasoned stocks. They employ a cross- 
sectional and time-series analysis whereby they show that differences in spreads 
between IPOs and seasoned stocks remain significant up to eight weeks into the 
aftermarket. Lower spreads for IPOs stem from both the levels as well as the 
differential elasticities of the determinants of the spread. However, they neither use
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intraday price data, nor account for corporate governance issues related to dual-class 
equity structures for IPOs. This study utilizes a more recent sample, intraday price 
data, and performs tests that add to the literature on market microstructure and IPOs 
by analyzing some very unique firms that have differential voting rights and common 
share structures.
2.3. Theory and Evidence on Dual-Class Recapitalizations
Dual-class firms may be viewed as a hybrid organizational form that is in 
between private, closely held firms and public corporations that have a widely dispersed 
ownership. The two (or sometimes more) classes of common stock usually have 
identical cash-flow claims but differential voting rights. Moreover, in most dual-class 
firms, only the inferior voting stock is publicly traded while the superior voting stock 
is closely held by managers and insiders. Various motivations for this arrangement of 
equity structure have been discussed by earlier researchers (see DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo [1985] for a discussion).
Managers of public corporations may hold common stock for its residual cash­
flow rights, or for the voting rights it carries, or for some combination o f both. A 
dual-class equity structure with different per-share voting rights enables managers to 
hold greater or fewer votes for a given cash-flow interest by holding different quantities 
of the two classes of stock. Consequently, it provides a framework within which the 
true motivation (cash-flow versus voting control) for managerial common stock holdings 
can be assessed, and the potential costs and benefits to a dual-class equity structure can 
be analyzed.
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Alchian and Demsetz [1972] argue that there is substantial cost involved in 
communicating information about managerial performance or investment opportunities 
to outside shareholders. Therefore, insider-managers hold greater voting rights to 
prevent relatively uninformed outside stockholders from mistakenly replacing the 
incumbent management team with a less productive group. Vote ownership also 
provides managers with greater influence over the composition of the board of directors 
and reduces the probability that difficult-to-evaluate proposals will be resisted or vetoed 
by relatively uninformed outside directors.
Alternatively, vote ownership may be used by managers to more firmly define 
their property rights to returns on their investments in organization-specific human 
capital. A dual-class equity arrangement serves as an effective anti-takeover mechanism 
and encourages managers to invest in organization-specific capital whose returns are 
potentially expropriable if outside stockholders replace the incumbent management with 
another group.
Evidence from DeAngelo and DeAngelo [1985] suggests that a dual-class equity 
arrangement is employed when there are net benefits to substantial managerial vote 
ownership, and when constraints at the personal and corporate levels make it expensive 
to have a single-class structure in which managers can afford equal percentage 
investments in cash-flows and votes. Personal wealth constraints on individuals or 
family members and/or the desire for diversification without losing voting control may 
induce them to issue low-voting shares. In contrast, a single-class structure would 
require managers to have majority ownership of stock to maintain similar voting
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control, which may be impossible or unattractive due to their limited personal wealth 
when compared with the level o f investment opportunities available to the firm.
There exist potential costs to a dual-class contractual arrangement. Managers 
may become inefficient and opportunistic and use such an arrangement to shield 
themselves from hostile takeovers. However, as DeAngelo and DeAngelo [1985] point 
out, the presence of vote ownership, anti-takeover provisions, golden parachutes, or 
other mechanisms that reduce the threat o f a hostile takeover does not necessarily imply 
that managerial decisions go undisciplined. Furthermore, it would be inaccurate to 
presume that any benefits from contracts that reduce the probability of a hostile 
takeover are necessarily small compared to the agency costs they engender. A 
resolution to this empirical question is attempted in the present study. Several implicit 
or explicit contracts could serve to align managerial incentives with the welfare of 
outside stockholders. For example, Holdemess and Sheehan [1991] show how closely- 
held Turner Broadcasting uses specially designed preferred stock to shield other 
stakeholders from poor managerial performance. Jensen and Meckling’s [1976] 
arguments suggest that in the event of greater managerial vote ownership with its 
attendant reduction in monitoring through external competition, managers with the right 
incentives would be induced to hold a larger share of cash-flow interest than they would 
optimally hold if they owned fewer votes. A substantial cash-flow interest would force 
managers to bear the ex-post wealth consequences of their own decisions.
Gilson [1993] points out that under perfect market conditions, a financial 
restructuring through a dual-class recapitalization should be identical to that through a
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leveraged buyout (LBO). Following a dual-class recapitalization, as compensation for 
giving up control, inferior vote stockholders sometimes receive an increased dividend 
and preferential treatment during liquidation compared to the superior vote 
stockholders. Similarly in an LBO, stockholders receive substantial premiums (30% 
to 40%) for giving up their claims to equity. Both transactions should be value- 
increasing resulting from concentrating control and ceteris paribus, investors should be 
indifferent between the two alternative mechanisms.
However, if  markets are not perfect, valuation impacts may differ depending 
upon whether control is concentrated in the hands of inside shareholders through a dual­
class recapitalization or an LBO. Moreover, two very different types of companies 
could be expected to resort to a dual-class recapitalization versus an LBO to reap 
benefits from concentrated control. An LBO would be the appropriate mechanism for 
stable, successful firms with large market share in relatively slow-growing, mature 
industries. These firms have large amounts o f "free cash-flow" and following Jensen’s 
[1986] arguments, an LBO would help provide the monitoring and incentive features 
of debt to eliminate agency problems that may typically result from wastage of the 
excess free cash-flows. Moreover, an LBO entails a competitive bidding process in the 
market for corporate control whereby all stockholders have the opportunity to 
participate and share in the gains of the transaction.
On the other hand, a dual-class recapitalization would be far from ideal for such 
firms. Providing managers with superior voting control relative to their equity stake 
would only serve to strengthen their position and provide them with the means to
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exploit the excess cash-flows to their own advantage with little benefit accruing to the 
outside shareholders. Firms that would benefit from concentrated control through a 
dual-class recapitalization usually are small, young, high-growth companies suffering 
from a shortage of capital. (Partch [1987] examines 44 dual-class firms and finds the 
sample firms to be relatively young. Fifty percent of the sample was less than ten years 
old, and of these twelve were less than five years old prior to recapitalization. Of the 
21 firms trading on NYSE/AMEX, 43% were less than ten years old compared to 29% 
of all listed firms.) The owner-managers face a problem whereby if they raise a lot of 
external equity, they end up diluting control and are subject to the risk of external 
interferences in the form of takeovers. If they raise too little through external equity, 
they retain majority control but suffer from personal wealth constraints and 
undiversified portfolios. A dual-class equity structure ideally provides such 
entrepreneurs with the necessary capital to undertake and sustain increased growth 
without fear of losing control or being unable to deal with external interferences.
Several studies consider the shareholder-wealth effects o f dual-class 
recapitalization. Lease, McConnell and Mikkelson [1983] test for differences in the 
market prices o f superior-voting and inferior-voting shares of 26 firms that have a 
public market for both share classes. They find that the superior voting shares trade 
at an average premium of 5.44% and conclude that a dual-class capital structure 
provides potential for incremental benefits for both managers and outside stockholders. 
Partch [1987], upon studying 44 recapitalization announcements between 1962 and 
1984, finds non-negative average abnormal stock price returns, and concludes that dual­
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class recapitalizations with disparate voting structures do not harm shareholders. In 
contrast, Jarrell and Poulsen [1988] find significantly negative abnormal announcement- 
day returns for their sample o f 89 dual-class recapitalizations. Further, they find 
significantly negative abnormal returns for firms announcing recapitalization since the 
NYSE imposed a moratorium on the delisting of dual-class stocks, compared with 
insignificant returns before the moratorium. Mikkelson and Partch [1992] examine the 
long-run operating performance of dual-class seasoned equity to see if  the managers 
exploit their protected position after recapitalization and allow firm performance to 
deteriorate. They find that the dual-class firms perform no worse than their single-class 
counterparts.
Chapter 3
Testable Hypotheses for Dual-Class IPOs
3.1. Introduction
The sample of dual-class IPOs provides rich ground for testing hypotheses 
related to capital structure, agency theory, securities issuance, corporate governance, 
and market microstructure. Three specific hypotheses are tested in this study: 1) The 
first issue addressed is whether or not the equity structure of a firm affects the adverse 
selection problem leading to differences in firm underpricing; 2) The second and more 
important concern investigated is whether or not there are additional agency costs 
generated by the issuance of diminished voting shares leading to differences in firm 
performance (both stock-price and operating/accounting). The agency relationship is 
further analyzed by determining whether or not managers o f dual-class IPOs, if 
motivated solely by control arguments in the event of poor firm performance, hold a 
very small percentage of the total cash-flow claim in the post-IPO firm; 3) Finally, it 
is ascertained whether or not there are net benefits to a dual-class choice arising from 
market microstructure considerations. The study tests the hypothesis that a dual-class 
voting structure for the firm’s ownership may help to mitigate the adverse selection 
problem facing uninformed traders. This would, ceteris paribus, improve the liquidity 
and increase the value of the firm’s stock.
3.2. The Underpricing Anomaly
In the event that a dual-class equity structure is motivated truly by financing and 
diversification constraints of the owner-manager (suffering from an under-investment
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problem) at the time of IPO, within the framework of Rock’s [1986] model, one should 
expect to see lower underpricing for dual-class firms. The dual-class structure should 
serve to reduce the adverse selection problem and should act as a certification 
mechanism to convey the good intent of the owner-managers and the high quality o f the 
firms’ projects.
Moreover, the agency and underpricing literatures suggest that the greater is the 
cash-flow claim of the entrepreneur, the lesser is the ex-ante uncertainty and lower are 
the agency costs associated with external equity. Thus, a larger cash-flow claim should 
lead to lower underpricing of the issue since lesser money needs to be left on the table. 
The cash-flow claim retained by the entrepreneur is also important because as suggested 
by Tinic [1988], a higher percentage of the claim retained reduces the potential legal 
liability and therefore should result in lower underpricing.
On the other hand, a dual-class capital structure allows entrepreneurs to reduce 
their cash-flow claim without a proportional reduction in control. If motivated solely 
by the intention to protect management in the event of poor firm performance, one 
expects the cash-flow claim to be lower and the underpricing to be higher than for 
single-class firms. Thus, the alternative hypothesis tested is that underpricing differs 
for the sample of dual-class firms versus that for single-class firms.
Previous research also provides several models which explain underpricing using 
either asymmetric information arguments or disciplinary mechanisms relying on the 
reputational capital of underwriters and auditors. Upon fitting a cross-sectional 
regression model across both dual and control groups, if  differences in underpricing
21
persist after controlling for both proxies for asymmetric information and disciplinary 
mechanisms, it may be safe to assert that they are arising due to the design of the 
equity structure. If a dual-class structure does indeed help reduce the adverse selection 
problem, ceteris paribus, one expects to see correspondingly lower underpricing for the 
dual-class firms.
3.3. The Long-Run Performance Anomaly
The appeal of dual-class stocks to managers stems from the ability to control a 
majority of votes (for example, it gives them veto power over potentially value- 
increasing takeover bids) without having substantial claims on cash-flows. Appendix 
D lists some actual CEO/CFO responses to the question of why they decided in favor 
of a dual-class IPO. As the managers’ cash-flow claim falls, their interests become less 
closely aligned with those of outside shareholders. This may result in sacrificing firm 
performance for personal benefits. On the other hand, if  the cash-flow claim of 
entrepreneurs remains high, it provides incentive to prevent firm performance from 
deteriorating, and acts as a substitute for the discipline provided by the threat of a 
hostile takeover. In addition, there may exist other disciplinary mechanisms such as 
presence of bank debt and stockholdings by financial institutions that serve as external 
monitors.
Moreover, in most cases the superior voting stock is closely held in its entirety 
by the owner-managers and cannot be publicly traded. The restrictions on its 
transferability and convertibility into inferior voting shares results in its complete 
illiquidity. However, the superior voting stockholders are at liberty to convert the
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superior voting shares into the inferior voting shares at any time and trade those. Such 
trades are allowed only upon the expiry o f the lock-up period following the IPO, which 
usually ranges around 180 days. If the managers or insiders are able to convert and 
trade only at the price prevailing after the expiry of the lock-up period, it may not be 
in their interest to allow stock-price performance to deteriorate. The superior vote 
stockholdings represent a cost to the insiders, which they shall be willing to bear only 
if  they have favorable information about the firm’s projects, give up liquidity initially 
and hope to make superior returns in the long-run. In such event, a dual-class equity 
structure should serve as a certification mechanism to signal the good intent o f the 
owner-managers as well as the good quality of the firm’s projects.
Jensen [1989], among others, argues that there may exist certain benefits to 
concentrated control. If  true, one would expect dual-class firms to perform, ceteris 
paribus, at least as well as single-class IPOs in the long run. The alternative hypothesis 
to be tested is that dual-class firms perform worse than single-class firms since 
entrepreneurs exploit their protected position, reducing the market value of the firm. 
Performance is evaluated by analyzing cumulative abnormal returns using various 
market indices as benchmarks, price-earning ratios, Tobin’s Q, cash-flow measures, and 
accounting profit ratios (operating performance) for a period of three years after the 
IPO date for samples of both dual-class and single-class firms.
3.4. The Liquidity Implications and Market Microstructure Effects
The sample of dual-class IPOs provides rich ground for testing hypotheses 
related to market microstructure. Although researchers have developed models and
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proposed several arguments to explain the underpricing and long-run underperformance 
of IPOs, no study has examined the market microstructure o f IPOs in depth, especially 
of those where control is concentrated in the hands of management. Previous research 
was rarely concerned with the per-share voting rights of the stock being offered or 
other corporate-govemance provisions that might impact market microstructure 
variables. This study considers the implications of differential voting power and 
management share holdings on the market microstructure characteristics and firm value 
of dual-class versus single-class IPOs.
Hegde and Miller [1989] posit that IPOs are on average characterized by severe 
informational asymmetry, greater price volatility, and increased trading activity. 
Moreover, due to differential ownership and control structures and public trading 
history, the levels of informational asymmetry, price volatility and trading activity may 
be different for dual-class IPOs, single-class IPOs, and seasoned stock. Previous 
research on dual-class firms posits that corporate insiders who wish to maintain control 
of the firm, yet raise substantial external capital for growth may rationally choose a 
dual voting class common stock structure. However, the extent of insider trading and 
its impact upon market microstructure in dual-class companies, versus ordinary single­
class firms is unknown.
This study further hypothesizes that there may be other benefits or costs to a 
dual-class choice that derive from market microstructure considerations. Previous 
research has well documented that ownership of the restricted voting stock is very broad 
compared to the highly concentrated ownership of the superior voting stock (see
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DeAngelo and DeAngelo [1985] and Partch [1987]). One may expect the superior 
voting stock to be less liquid due to the concentrated nature of ownership or the 
inherent restrictions on transferability and convertibility. However, it retains a control 
premium relative to the restricted voting stock (see Lease, McConnell and Mikkelson 
[1983]). In several cases the superior voting rights stock does not even trade publicly 
(as in the sample of IPOs due to the severe restrictions on transferability). However, 
in all cases the superior voting rights stock is convertible into the more liquid restricted 
voting stock, while the reverse is never allowed.
It is possible that managers and other insiders may be willing to give up liquidity 
if they are interested in the long-term prospects of the firm and hope to reap long-run 
superior returns from their investment in the firm. As Amihud and Mendelson [1986] 
suggest, rational investors will sort themselves into "trading clienteles" with those 
having a long horizon (such as managers and insiders) selecting the low liquidity assets 
relative to more frequent (liquidity/public) traders. DeAngelo and DeAngelo [1985] 
find that officers of firms creating dual class common stock increase their proportionate 
holdings of superior voting rights stock and decrease their proportionate holdings in 
restricted voting stock.
For all IPOs in this study, the superior voting stock is closely held and not 
allowed to publicly trade. The restrictions on transferability and convertibility of such 
stock ensures its illiquidity in totality. However, the insiders or managers are at liberty 
to trade the inferior voting stock. But given the aforementioned arguments, they may 
be willing to give up liquidity even in the case of the inferior voting stock if they are
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primarily interested in long-horizon returns. In such event a dual-class equity structure 
may serve as a certification mechanism to reduce the adverse selection problem 
typically associated with the IPO market. If public or uninformed traders (and more 
importantly specialists or market makers) expect that insiders holding the superior 
voting stock will not trade the more liquid (inferior) class o f stock based upon private 
information, then the bid-ask spread should be smaller than the otherwise identical case 
where insiders and outsiders hold and trade a single class o f stock. This argument is 
similar in spirit to that of Barclay and Smith [1988] who suggest that valuation impacts 
due to asymmetric information may explain management’s choice o f cash dividends 
over share repurchases to distribute cash to shareholders.
On the other hand, it is possible that the choice of a dual-class share structure 
could adversely affect liquidity, thus negatively impacting firm value. The presence of 
large blockholders who do not actively trade the firm’s shares implies that a dual-class 
firm would have less public float than an otherwise identical firm with a single class 
of stock outstanding. Less public float would imply a less active secondary market for 
the firm’s stock. It is well known that thinner stocks have wider bid-ask spreads than 
more active issues. Additionally, it is likely that such issues would receive less 
attention from analysts and brokerage firms since potential commission revenues are 
small (See Brennan and Hughes [1991] and Bhide [1993] for discussion and evidence 
on this issue). If  less public information is produced for dual-class firms, the private 
information possessed by more knowledgeable investors (not necessarily corporate 
insiders) could create a larger adverse selection problem for these firms.
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Using the samples described earlier the study proposes tests o f the foregoing 
hypotheses through controlled comparisons of trading volume, price volatility and bid- 
ask spreads. Controls across samples include firm size, industry, and time of advent 
into the public securities markets. Also, for the firms in each sample the study 
decomposes the spread using the model developed by Stoll [1989] and Huang and Stoll 
[1993] in an attempt to measure systematic differences in the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread. Finally, the Ownership Reporting System (ORS) 
insider trading data provide a final avenue of verifying any differences in insider trading 
behavior in dual-class versus single-class IPOs.
Chapter 4 
Data and Methodology
4.1. Introduction
The study is restricted to those IPOs that are included in the 1991 CRSP daily 
files. Data on all 118 dual-class firms that went public between 1984 and 1990 has 
been obtained from Investment Dealers Digest Information Services Inc. (IDD) and 
from Securities Data Corporation (SDC). A control sample of single-class IPOs has 
been carefully constructed matched by exchange, time of issue, industry, and firm size 
using 1913 IPOs during 1984-90 from IDD (See Appendix B for matching criteria). 
To analyze firm performance for a period of three years following the IPO date, only 
98 dual-class and correspondingly 98 control IPOs between 1984 and 1988 are used in 
the underpricing and long-run hypotheses tests. Furthermore, due to non-availability 
of intraday transactions data for NASDAQ firms, the market microstructure tests are 
restricted to 30 IPOs on NYSE and AMEX during 1985-88.
A description o f the information available on each firm is provided in Appendix 
A. Data from IDD was supplemented when necessary from various sources including 
Disclosure, S&P Corporation Records, Moody’s, Spectrum, SEC Q File, Million 
Dollar Directory, and COMPUSTAT. Any best efforts offerings, unit offerings, 
Regulation A offerings, closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts (REITS), limited 
partnerships, american depository receipts (ADR’s), and certificates are excluded. Of 
the dual-class sample (and correspondingly the control sample), 66 were identified on 
NASDAQ and 32 were identified on AMEX or NYSE. Over the three years following
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the IPO four dual-class firms originating on NASDAQ became listed on either AMEX 
or NYSE, while none delisted to NASDAQ. Amongst the control group firms, there 
were no firms that switched across trading locations.
Daily returns and trading volume data to be used in the underpricing and long- 
run stock-price performance hypotheses are obtained from the 1991 CRSP daily files 
for the 98 dual and 98 single-class control firms. Any changes in trading location 
across the exchanges are fully accounted for while computing the monthly returns. 
Accounting and operating data to be used in the long-run operating performance 
hypotheses are obtained from the 1990 and 1991 COMPUSTAT annual files. Intraday 
transactions data to be used in the market microstructure hypotheses is obtained from 
the Institute for the Study of Security Markets (ISSM) files for the 30 AMEX and 
NYSE firms. Finally, data on insider trades for verifying differences, if  any, in the 
insider trading behavior o f dual versus control samples is obtained from the Ownership 
Reporting System (ORS) tapes provided by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
4.2. Description of Dual-Class Firms
The dual-class sample firms represent a wide array of industries, products and 
services (e.g., McCaw Cellular, Aaron Spelling Productions, Fruit of the Loom, 
Spiegel, Freeport McMoran Copper). An industry profile is outlined in Appendix C. 
The classes differ with respect to voting rights relative to cash-flow rights. Neither 
class of common stock is callable, authorized but unissued, or preferred. All firms are 
incorporated in the United States.
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In terms o f voting control, the firms have one of the following arrangements3: 
1) ten out of 98 firms have voting, non-voting, where Class A shareholders are not 
entitled to vote except in special matters o f interest, while Class B are entitled to one 
vote per share; 2) 30 have pooled voting, where both Class A and Class B have 
fractional voting rights with Class B entitled to a much higher number of votes per 
share in all matters; 3) 16 have class voting, where both classes have one vote per share 
except that Class A shareholders are entitled to elect 25% of the directors, while Class 
B are entitled to elect the rest; and 4) 42 have both pooled and class voting, where 
Class A shareholders are entitled to elect 25 % of the directors, Class B shareholders 
are entitled to elect the rest, and Classes A and B have fractional voting rights in all 
other matters (see DeAngelo and DeAngelo [1985] for a description of the various types 
of voting arrangements).
In the typical dual-class firm, the Class B shares are very closely held (in some 
cases entirely by the founder/CEO), they are not publicly traded, and more than three 
quarters of the total voting power is controlled by five or fewer individuals (in most 
cases managers and their families). In several cases, there is significant family 
involvement and the top management positions (including that of CEO) are held by 
family members.
Table 1 provides the distribution of the universe of dual and single-class IPOs 
by year and exchange. In contrast to 87% of single-class IPOs, only 67% of all dual-
3Three firms in the sample have three classes of common stock - A, B, and C. Class C is non-voting 
but takes precedence over Classes A and B in the event of liquidation. These three firms too belong to 
any one of the four groups aforementioned based on the distribution of voting control between Classes 
A and B.
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Table 1
The Single and  Dual-Class IPO Universe by Y ear and  Exchange 
The number o f IPOs is based upon Investment Dealers Digest. The samples 
here do not include best efforts offerings, but may include unit offerings, 
closed-end mutual funds, and real estate investment trusts which are however 
excluded from the long-run samples between 1984-88 (later in Table 2) for 
the purpose of this study.
Year NASDAQ Amex-NYSE
Single Class Dual Class Single Class Dual Class
No. of 
IPOs
% of 
Total
No. of 
IPOs
% of 
Total
No. of 
IPOs
% of 
Total
No. of 
IPOs
% of 
Total
1984 246 19.73 9 12.00 15 3.57 2 5.56
1985 187 14.99 13 17.33 32 7.62 2 5.56
1986 247 19.81 19 25.33 64 15.23 12 33.33
1987 266 21.33 20 26.67 102 24.29 8 22.22
1988 108 8.66 5 6.67 84 20.00 8 22.22
1989 91 7.30 8 10.67 64 15.24 3 8.33
1990 102 8.18 1 1.33 59 14.05 1 2.78
Total 1247 100.0 75 100.0 420 100.00 36 100.00
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class IPOs chose to list on NASDAQ. IPOs appearing on NASDAQ are somewhat 
more frequent during the early part of the sample period, while those appearing on the 
AMEX or NYSE are more frequent in the later part of the period. Table 2 gives the 
number of IPOs in various samples used in this study by exchange and by year of offer, 
after excluding best efforts offerings, units, closed-end funds, REITS, limited 
partnerships, ADR’s, and certificates. Table 3 gives the number o f dual-class IPOs by 
voting arrangement. Table 4 gives the number of dual-class IPOs based on the per- 
share voting rights. Table 5 gives the number of dual-class IPOs based on the 
percentage of majority control closely held by 5 or fewer individuals.
Tables 6, 7, and 8 describe the cash and stock dividend rights, liquidation rights, 
and convertibility rights respectively of dual-class firm stockholders. In 68.37% of the 
dual-class sample, the two classes of shares enjoy identical cash-dividend rights. In 
other cases, Class A enjoys a slightly higher dividend than Class B. Stock dividends 
are usually payable on the same basis and at the same time on the respective classes. 
In 77.55% of the sample, the two classes of stockholders share rateably in liquidation. 
In other cases, Class A shares receive preferential treatment for a specified amount and 
thereafter share rateably with Class B shares. A preferential treatment to Class A in 
matters of dividend and liquidation may provide incentives to investors to hold such 
shares despite their inferior voting rights.
Most Class B shares (92.86% of the sample) are convertible into Class A share- 
per-share, but the reverse is never allowed. While Class A shares are freely 
transferable at all times, the transferability of Class B shares is highly restricted. The
Table 2
D istribution of IPOs between 1984-88 by Exchange and by Year 
Best efforts offerings, unit offerings, closed-end funds, REITS, ADR’s and 
certificates are excluded.
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 TOTAL
NASDAQ
Single (Total) 245 184 247 265 108 1049
Dual, Control 9 13 19 20 5 66
Amex-NYSE
Single (Total) 15 24 45 72 65 221
Dual, Control 2 2 12 8 8 32
Table 3
Distribution of Dual-Class IPOs by 
Voting Group
Voting Group No. of Firms % of Total
Voting, Non-Voting 10 10.20
Pooled Voting 30 30.61
Class Voting 16 16.33
Pooled and Class Voting 42 42.86
Total 98 100.00
Table 4
Distribution of Dual-Class IPOs by 
Per-Share Voting Rights 
The per-share votes o f Class A (inferior voting) stock and Class B 
(superior voting) stock for firms in the Voting-Non Voting group 
are 0:1, for firms in the Class Voting group are 1:1, and for firms 
in the Pooled Voting group or the Pooled and Class Voting group 
are anywhere between 1:2 and 1:500.
Per-Share Votes for ClassA (inferior) : 
ClassB (superior)
No. of Firms % of Total
0:1 10 10.20
1;1 16 16.33
1:2 1 1.02
1:3 6 6.12
1:4 5 5.10
1:5 5 5.10
1:10 50 51.02
1:20 3 3.06
1:30 1 1.02
1:500 1 1.02
Total 98 100.00
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Table 5
D istribution o f Dual-Class IPOs by Percentage of 
Total Voting Control Closely Held 
The numbers in this table do not reveal the actual percentage o f total voting 
control closely held. They reflect the percentage of total voting control held by 
five or fewer individuals/family members.
% of Voting Control 
Closely Held
No. of Firms % of Total Avg. No. of 
yote-holders
13% -20% 2 3.20 2.50
21% -30% 4 6.50 2.00
31% -40% 6 9.70 2.33
41% -50% 5 8.00 2.00
51% -60% 8 12.90 2.00
61% -70% 6 9.70 2.83
71% - 80% 7 11.30 2.00
81% -90% 7 11.30 1.42
91% -95% 7 11.30 1.42
96% - i9% 9 14.50 2.14
100% 1 1.60 2.00
Total 62 100.00
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Table 6
Cash-Dividend Rights of Class A (Inferior Voting) and 
Class B (Superior Voting)
Stockholders in Dual-Class IPOs
Cash-Dividend Rights of Classes A and B No. of 
F inns
% of 
Total
A and B have identical rights except that dividends may be declared 
and paid on B only if  at such time an equal per share dividend is 
declared and paid on A. A dividend may be declared on A but not B.
67 68.37
No dividend may be paid on B unless simultaneously therewith there 
is paid a dividend on A of at least X %  of the dividend on B, where X 
is 105 for 3 firms, 110 for 14 firms, 115 for 3 firms, 118 for 1 firm, 
120 for 4 firms, 200 for 1 firm, and 1000 for 1 firm.
27 27.55
A has preference to the annual non-cumulative dividend of $ Y per 
share, and thereafter A and B share rateably, where Y is 0.10 for 1 
firm, 0.08 for 1 firm, and 1.00 for 1 firm.
3 3.06
A is entiltled to cumulative dividends of $0.41 per annum, and 
thereafter A & B share rateably.
1 1.02
Total 98 100.00
Note on Stock-Dividends. Stock-Splits. and Future Issuance of Class B:
Equal stock dividends are paid in Class A and in Class B on the respective classes. In some cases stock- 
dividends on Class A may be paid only in Class A shares while stock-dividends on Class B may be paid 
in either Class A or Class B. No stock-split, dividend or reclassification of Class B may be declared 
unless the company similarly splits or reclassifies Class A or pays a similar dividend in Class A on Class 
A. No company may issue any additional shares of Class B without the approval of a majority of the 
votes of the outstanding shares of Class A and Class B, each voting separately as a class. A company 
may however issue additional shares of Class B in the event of any stock-splits or stock-dividends.
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Table 7
Liquidation Rights of Class A (Inferior Voting) and 
Class B (Superior Voting)
Stockholders in Dual-Class IPOs
Liquidation Rights of Classes A and B No. of 
Firms
% of 
Total
A and B share rateably. 76 77.55
A is entitled to $ X per share before any distribution to B, and thereafter 
A and B share rateably, where X is 0.10 for 1 firm, 2.50 for 2 firms, 
5.70 for 1 firm, 8.00 for 1 firm, and 17.75 for 2 firms.
7 7.14
A is entitled to $ Y per share before any distribution to B, then B gets $ 
Z per share before any further distribution to A, and thereafter A and B 
share rateably, where Y =1.00 and Z =  1.00 for 2 firms, Y =3.00 and 
Z=3.00 for 1 firm, Y=4.16 and Z = 4 .16 for 1 firm, Y =5.00 and 
Z=5.00 for 1 firm, Y =7.50 and Z=7.50 for 2 firms, Y =9.00 and 
Z=9.00 for 1 firm, Y = 19.53 and Z =  19.53 for 1 firm, and Y = 10.00 
and Z=0.20 for 1 firm.
10 10.21
A is entitled to X% of payment to B, where X is 110 for 1 firm, and 
2000 for 1 firm.
2 2.04
Class C (non-voting) has majority rights in liquidation and takes 
precedence over both A and B.
3 3.06
Total 98 100.00
Note on Liquidation Rights:
In matters such as liquidation of company, a merger, consolidation, or other business combination of 
company, or a reclassification, recapitalization or exchange of the shares of company’s capital stock, the 
shares of Class A common shall not be treated less favorably than the shares of Class B common without 
the approval of a majority of the issued and outstanding shares of Class A common voting separately as 
a class and a majority of the issued and outstanding shares of Class B voting separately as a class.
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Table 8
Covertibility of Shares in Dual-Class IPOs 
Class B (superior voting) is always convertible into Class A (inferior 
voting), but the reverse is never allowed.
Convertibility No. of
Firms
% of 
Total
B into A share per share at the option of the holder (except upon 
approval of liquidation or dissolution of firm by stockholders).
91 92.86
One B into 0.10 A at the option of the holder. 1 1.02
All B automatically into A share per share if the number of shares 
of B outstanding falls below a number X, where X is 100,000 for 1 
firm, and 2,910,885 for 1 firm.
2 2.04
All B automatically into A share per share if the ratio of number of 
shares of B to the total of A and B outstanding falls below Y%, 
where Y is 12.5 for 1 firm.
1 1.02
B into A share per share at the option of the holder or upon a date 
prespecified at the time of IPO when all B automatically convert 
into A.
2 2.04
B into A share per share at the end of a preference period. A 
preference period may end upon the first to occur: 1) a 
prespecified anniversary of the closing date of the offering, 2) the 
end of any two consecutive years in which the company shall have 
had consolidated net income after taxes of not less than X% of the 
assumed capital for such years, where X is 6 for 1 firm.
1 1.02
Total 98 100.00
Note on Transferahilitv and Covertihilitv:
Class A is freely transferable at all times. Class B may not be sold, gifted, or transferred except to and 
among principally such holders’ spouse, certain of such holders’ relatives (child, grandchild, sibling, 
parent), certain trusts established for their benefit, corporations and partnerships principally owned by 
such holders, their relatives and such trusts, and such holders’ estate. When Class B is convertible into 
Class A share per share at the holder’s option, the conversion is automatic on transfer by a holder of 
Class B share to any party other than members of his family (a lineal ascendant or descendant or a spouse 
of a Class B holder), and in some cases another holder of Class B.
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provision in some firms for automatic conversion of B into A upon a prespecified date 
or at the end of a preference period suggests that in a new operating and legal 
environment upon going public, these firms need time to stabilize their earnings among 
other things without external interference. Moreover, these firms have greater faith in 
the founders’ ability to look after the firms’ best interests (long and short-term) than in 
the ability of the competitive market for corporate control, and especially in that of 
corporate raiders with short-term interests. In short, such provision apparently signals 
no managerial entrenchment. A dual-class equity structure for IPOs, ceteris paribus, 
may serve to instill confidence in the minds of investors and thereby help reduce the 
adverse selection problem.
Table 9 provides information on the raw performance and ownership structure 
of dual-class firms, grouped by the type of voting arrangement. Of the total shares 
outstanding, an average of 21% is held by institutions, 32% is held by 5% insiders, 
20% is held by 10% insiders, and 33% is held by officers and directors. The numbers 
suggest that financial institutions may serve as external monitors since, on average, they 
own a fifth of all shares in dual-class firms. The implied cash-flow claim of owner- 
managers (computed as Class B shares outstanding/(Class A +  Class B outstanding)) 
is on average 49 %4, which together with a low average dilution of 27.21 % suggest 
that managers do have incentives to act in the interests of outside shareholders. 
Furthermore, the claim appears large enough to enable managers to make subsequent 
offerings (resulting in its dilution) and yet maintain firm control. The number of
“The implied cash-flow claim of owner-managers is at least 49% since the computation does not 
include the inferior voting shares held by them. This data could not be obtained.
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Table 9
Descriptive Statistics on Ownership Structure, Performance, and Voting 
Control for 98 Dual-Class IPOs between 1984-88
Variable of Interest Type of Voting Arrangement
Vtg., 
Non-Vtg. 
[9 Firms] 
Mean 
(Median)
Pooled 
Vtg. [20 
Firms] 
Mean 
(Median)
Class 
Vtg. [11 
Firms] 
Mean 
(Median)
Pooled & 
Class [39 
Firms] 
Mean 
(Median)
Tot. Sam­
ple [98 
Firms] 
Mean 
(Median)
Holding Period Return at 
End of Year 1
0.1107
(0.0592)
0.1255
(0.0234)
0.2446
(0.5085)
-0.0438
(-0.1005)
0.0341
(-0.0333)
Holding Period Return at 
End of Year 2
0.2280
(-0.0145)
0.1526
(0.1663)
0.6845
(0.7735)
0.1104
(-0.1282)
0.1690
(-0.1120)
Holding Period Return at 
End of Year 3
0.4854
(-0.0326)
0.2030
(0.0315)
0.7184
(0.0443)
0.2488
(0.0397)
0.2882
(0.1068)
No. of Institutional 
Stockholders
10.20
(10.00)
28.75
(25.50)
26.33
(31.00)
14.04
(10.00)
15.62
(10.00)
% of Total Stock Held by 
Institutions
13.71
(12.71)
31.72
(20.11)
25.30
(22.40)
22.43
(13.08)
20.88
(13.03)
No. of 5 % Insider 
Stockholders
1.00
(1.00)
3.50
(3.50)
2.80
(3.00)
2.64
(2.00)
2.57
(3.00)
% of Total Stock Held by 
5% Insiders
5.69
(5.69)
66.87
(66.87)
28.84
(30.57)
30.97
(14.30)
31.61
(20.80)
No. of 10% Insider 
Stockholders
8.75
(7.00)
8.50
(8.50)
5.83
(5.50)
5.80
(5.00)
6.19
(5.50)
% of Total Stock Held by 
10% Insiders
26.10
(29.95)
21.74
(21.74)
6.21
(7.06)
23.18
(21.52)
19.55
(18.35)
% of Total Stock Held by 
Officers and Directors
N.A. 20.50
(20.50)
13.96
(18.18)
46.45
(56.19)
33.35
(20.52)
% of Implied Cash-Flow 
Claim of Owner-Managers
40.37
(24.15)
45.10
(43.68)
42.00
(37.94)
54.54
(56.98)
48.76
(48.75)
% of Total Voting Control 
Closely Held
71.04
(72.35)
67.72
(70.20)
44.22
(38.50)
77.37
(83.15)
68.00
(72.15)
No. of Owner-Managers 
Holding Previous %
2.28
(2.00)
1.87
(1.00)
2.44
(2.00)
2.08
(2.00)
2.07
(2.00)
No. of Superior Voting 
Stockholders as a Fraction 
of Total Stockholders
0.5297
(0.5297)
0.0809
(0.0295)
0.2194
(0.1506)
0.1643
(0.0952)
0.1811
(0.0900)
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superior-voting stockholders as a percentage of total stockholders is on average only 
18%, which suggests that voting control is greatly concentrated in relatively few hands. 
Finally, an average of 68% of the total voting control is held by only 3 shareholders.
4.3. Firm  Profiles of Dual versus Single-Class IPOs
Tables 10 and 11 list descriptive statistics on the samples o f 98 dual and single­
class control IPOs. The profiles are similar in several respects due to the matching 
criteria. The post-offering market values are similar for the median dual and single­
class firms (62.0 million and 52.8 million respectively). The total shares offered (both 
primary and secondary) as well as firm dilution are higher for the control firms, while 
the post-offering price to book ratio, gross spread charged by the underwriters, and 
firm age are higher for the dual-class IPOs. Interestingly, while both classes appear 
to be cold issues (an issue is said to be cold if  the offer price is revised downward from 
the midpoint of the filing range), the average dual-class firm both revises the offering 
price downward from the filing midpoint and offers fewer shares than intended at the 
time of filing5.
To show the results of the matching procedure, some descriptive statistics 
(aftermarket price, market value of equity, number of shares outstanding, and trading 
volume as on the first trading day subsequent to going public) are listed for all single­
class, dual-class, and control group firms by exchange in Tables 12 and 13. The 
profiles are similar with no statistically significant differences in the means of the dual 
versus control samples (using a t-test).
5 See Benveniste and Spindt [1989], and Hanley [1993] for a review of the partial adjustment 
phenomenon.
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Table 10
Descriptive Statistics on 98 Dual-Class IPOs between 1984-88 at Time of IPO
Variable of Interest N Mean Median Std Min Max
$ Offer Amount (mill) 98 36.537 19.700 55.444 2.700 325.50
Offer Price Per Share ($) 98 11.792 11.910 5.082 1.250 25.000
Tot Shares Offered (mill) 98 2.769 1.800 3.805 0.300 27.000
Primary Shares Offered (mill) 98 2.274 1.000 3.845 0.000 27.000
Secondary Shares Offered (mill) 98 0.496 0.000 0.921 0.000 4.500
Shares O/S before IPO (mill) 98 10.421 4.200 19.413 0.310 111.174
Shares O/S after IPO (mill) 98 13.376 6.101 23.693 0.628 134.774
Dilution % 98 27.211 24.300 20.144 0.040 100.000
Age 98 23.358 9.000 30.222 1.000 122.000
Mkt Val after Offer (mill) 98 187.233 62.000 397.977 3.500 2393.600
Price/Book Ratio after Offer 98 3.879 2.425 4.576 0.400 30.530
Book/Price Ratio after Offer 98 0.449 0.405 0.333 0.033 2.500
Gross Spread ($) 98 0.822 0.840 0.301 0.125 1.700
Mgmt. Fee ($) 98 0.172 0.175 0.065 0.040 0.427
Under. Fee ($) 98 0.184 0.180 0.076 0.040 0.428
Sell. Cone. ($) 98 0.469 0.500 0.174 0.038 0.900
Stock Price Filing - Low ($) 98 11.921 12.000 4.767 1.820 22.000
Stock Price Filing - High ($) 98 13.872 14.000 5.493 1.820 24.000
% Chng Mid File Price to Offer 98 -0.071 -0.036 0.122 -40.000 20.000
Total Shares Filed (mill) 98 2.912 1.928 3.591 0.270 22.000
% Chng Shares Filed to Offer 98 -0.027 0.000 0.146 -85.000 0.300
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Table 11
Descriptive Statistics on 98 Control Single-Class HPOs between 1984-88 at
Time of IPO
Variable of Interest N Mean Median Std Min Max
$ Offer Amount (mill) 98 59.262 16.550 190.699 1.900 1,456.000
Offer Price Per Share ($) 98 10.298 10.000 4.718 2.000 28.000
Tot Shares Offered (mill) 98 4.035 1.725 9.513 0.400 60.690
Primary Shares Offered (mill) 98 3.039 1.287 7.895 0.000 60.690
Secondary Shares Offered (mill) 98 0.996 0.000 5.812 0.000 52.000
Shares O/S before IPO (mill) 98 8.979 3.367 17.718 0.010 117.778
Shares O/S after IPO (mill) 98 11.998 5.443 22.192 0.930 150.710
Dilution % 98 32.284 26.400 21.997 4.800 100.000
Age 98 12.500 5.000 19.894 1.000 95.000
Mkt Val after Offer (mill) 98 167.513 52.800 415.373 4.400 2486.700
Price/Book Ratio after Offer 98 3.202 2.920 2.257 0.540 17.470
Book/Price Ratio after Offer 98 0.438 0.342 0.292 0.057 1.852
Gross Spread ($) 98 0.721 0.700 0.255 0.200 1.600
Mgmt. Fee ($) 98 0.155 0.145 0.049 0.050 0.320
Under. Fee ($) 98 0.167 0.165 0.052 0.050 0.290
Sell. Cone. ($) 98 0.411 0.400 0.161 0.100 1.000
Stock Price Filing - Low ($) 98 10.073 10.000 4.218 2.000 22.000
Stock Price Filing - High ($) 98 11.654 11.000 4.814 2.000 26.000
% Chng Mid File Price to Offer 98 -0.053 0.000 0.120 -0.333 0.333
Total Shares Filed (mill) 98 3.682 1.700 8.161 0.450 60.690
% Chng Shares Filed to Offer 98 0.099 0.000 0.958 -0.599 9.000
Table 12 
The IPO A fterm arket:
Descriptive Statistics on the Amex-NYSE Single-Class, 
Dual-Class, and Control Firm s 
PRC ($), MVAL (000’s $), CURSHR (000’s), and VOL are the closing 
price, market-value, shares outstanding on NYSE/AMEX, and the volume 
traded respectively on the 1st trading day after the offer date. For the 
Dual-Class IPOs, CURSHR represents only the inferior voting stock 
outstanding that is publicly traded, while the market-value represents both 
classes assuming that the closely held superior voting shares traded at the 
same price as the inferior voting stock.
IPO TYPE N Mean Median Sid Min Max
PRC: Single 221 13.29 11.00 6.74 4.000 71.250
Dual 32 13.19 13.44 4.18 4.625 25.250
Control 32 12.20 9.94 5.64 5.000 30.750
MVAL: Single 221 276,662.22 103,105.90 432,883.08 104.00 2,953,512.00
Dual 32 218,184.38 116,850.00 362,940.81 15,200.00 2,048,700.00
Control 32 268,226.05 93,740.44 529,859.28 9,922.50 2,310,000.00
CURSHR: Single 221 17,924.85 9,500.00 22,909.67 11.00 140,000.00
Dual 32 11,936.31 4,482.50 20,461.93 288.00 107,846.00
Control 32 17,229.47 7,713.00 26,588.01 1,260.00 140,000.00
VOL: Single 218 1,246,144.52 456,150.00 2,429,883.98 0.00 18,880,000.00
Dual 32 756,653.13 394,350.00 1,354,383.45 0.00 7,107,000.00
Control 30 1,753,010.00 408,850.00 4,405,859.87 2,800.00 18,880,000.00
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Table 13 
The IPO  A fterm arket:
Descriptive Statistics on the  NASDAQ Single-Class, Dual-Class, and
Control Firms
PRC ($), MVAL (000’s $), CURSHR (000’s), and VOL are the closing 
price, market-value, shares outstanding on NASDAQ, and the volume 
traded respectively on the 1st trading day after the offer date. For the 
Dual-Class IPOs, CURSHR represents only the inferior voting stock 
outstanding that is publicly traded, while the market-value represents 
both classes assuming that the closely held superior voting shares traded 
at the same price as the inferior voting stock.
IPO TYPE N Mean Median Std Min Max
PRC: Single 1049 9.66 9.06 4,81 0.125 38.875
Dual 66 12.07 11.47 6.46 1.500 30.125
Control 65 9.57 9.00 4.18 2.688 20.500
MVAL: Single 1040 51,092.38 27,658.06 72,310.52 3,670.50 965,250.00
Dual 66 176,406.34 48,000.00 421,889.55 3,500.00 2,393,600.00
Control 65 63,569.11 35,190.00 68,234.47 4,533.75 278,410.50
CURSHR: Single 1040 5,114.18 3,393.00 6,528.72 399.00 99,000.00
Dual 66 4,655.46 2,888.00 7,493.26 300.00 55,969.00
Control 65 6,160.35 4,000.00 5,234.39 930.00 22,534.00
VOL: Single 1049 521,236.61 293,775.00 766,046.15 0.00 10,303,900.00
Dual 66 745,298.53 310,995.00 1,208,579.20 0.00 5,998,423.00
Control 65 746,472.34 449,600.00 987,029.99 10,500.00 4,065,415.00
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4.4. Methodology
The underpricing and long-run performance analysis is carried out for the total 
samples as well as for sub-samples based upon the exchange on which the firms trade 
to account for firm differences, if  any, across exchanges. The results are compared to 
those for a control group IPOs. For general comparisons, robustness checks, and the 
reader’s information, the study also documents results on the group (universe) of all 
single-class IPOs.
Due to non-availability o f intraday transactions data for NASDAQ firms, the 
market microstructure and insider trading analysis is restricted to dual-class and single­
class control IPOs on NYSE/AMEX during 1985 and 1988.
4.4.1 Underpricing
The first-day underpricing is measured by computing the return for the initial 
period defined as the offering date to the first closing price listed on the CRSP daily 
NASDAQ and Amex-NYSE tapes. It is further determined if differences in equity 
structure, ceteris paribus, result in differences in underpricing across the dual and 
control samples. The following cross-sectional regression model is fitted using various 
proxies for uncertainty from previous research6 and other potential explanatory 
variables including those from Hanley [1993] and the aforementioned proposition 
regarding the design of the governance structure:
IRi =  a 0 +  a,Di +  a 2OR; +  c^Age; +  a 4RGPj +  a 5IB; +  a 6AUD; +  a 7EXCH; 
+  a 8CHPRC; +  a 9CHSHRj +  a 10UCOMP; +  e;
6 See Affleck-Graves, Hegde, Miller, and Reilly [1993] for an extensive discussion.
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where IR; is the initial day return, Dt (dummy variable) equals 1 if dual-class and 0 if 
single-class, OR (ownership retention) is the percentage of shares retained by the 
owner/manager at the time of IPO, AGEj is the number o f years the firm was 
incorporated prior to the IPO, RGP; is the reciprocal of the gross proceeds from the 
IPO defined as the number o f shares offered times the offering price, IB; (lead 
investment banker) equals 1 if the lead underwriter was among the top eight investment 
banking firms in the United States as defined by the Institutional Investor and 0 
otherwise, AUD{ (auditor) equals 1 if the auditor was a big-6 firm and 0 otherwise, 
EXCHi (exchange) equals 1 if  NASDAQ and 0 if AMEX or NYSE, CHPRQ is the 
percentage revision in the offer price from the midpoint of the filing range, CHSHRj 
is the percentage revision in the number of shares offered from the shares filed, 
UCOMPj (underwriter compensation) is the gross spread as a percentage o f offer price 
that the underwriting syndicate receives for taking the firm public. Previous research 
and our expectations suggest that a o> 0 , cqCO, a 2< 0 , a 3< 0 ,  a4> 0 ,  a 5< 0 ,  a 6< 0 ,  
a 7> 0 ,  oig >  0, a 9> 0 , and a i0> 0 .
A priori, greater is the ownership retention by the owner-managers at the time 
of IPO, lesser should be the ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the firm (following Leland 
and Pyle [1977]), and consequently lower should be the underpricing. Similarly age 
may help reduce the adverse selection problem. For example, a firm with a long 
history of existance has a track record that may enable investors to enhance their 
information set. The degree of ex-ante uncertainty may be expected to be inversely 
related to firm size or the size of the issue. Extant literature argues that the
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reputational capital of investment bankers and auditors helps certify firm quality. Only 
good firms could be expected to be underwritten and certified by top reputed investment 
bankers and auditors (see Beatty and Ritter [1986], Booth and Smith [1986], and Carter 
and Manaster [1990]), thus reducing the ex-ante uncertainty and the need for 
underpricing.
Usually smaller firms IPO on NASDAQ relative to the NYSE or AMEX. 
Smaller firms are also known to suffer from greater adverse selection problems. 
Hence, one may expect NASDAQ firms to be underpriced moii; than NYSE or AMEX 
firms. Hanley [1993] finds evidence in support of the model provided by Benveniste 
and Spindt [1989] whereby those IPOs that revise the offer price or number of shares 
offered upward from the midpoint of the filing ranges respectively are deemed as hot 
issues and are greater underpriced. Finally, underpricing may be expected to be 
directly proportional to the underwriter effort in taking the firm public depending on 
the degree o f ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the IPO. Effort may be measured 
through the compensation the underwriter receives for his services (commission 
received as a percentage of the offer price).
4.4.2 Long-Run Performance
For evaluating long-run stock-price performance, the analysis uses Ritter’s 
[1991] methodology using various market indices to compute market-adjusted 
(abnormal) returns over a three year period following the offer date. In the event that 
the aftermarket is efficient and the benchmarks are correct, zero abnormal average
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returns should accrue to the IPOs. Significant non-zero average abnormal returns 
would indicate either mispricing by the market or benchmark error.
Monthly returns are computed for the aftermarket period (months 1-36) defined 
as three years after the IPO excluding the initial period. Months comprise successive 
21 trading day periods relative to the IPO. The monthly returns are computed by 
compounding the daily returns for these 21 trading day periods.
The cumulative average monthly adjusted returns (CARl t) for a period of three 
years are computed with monthly portfolio rebalancing and using the CRSP value- 
weighted NASDAQ index (as well as other indices) for the total samples to evaluate 
their long-run performance. While analyzing sub-samples based on the exchange on 
which the IPOs trade, the monthly raw returns are adjusted using the respective 
exchange’s value-weighted (as well as equally weighted) index. The monthly 
benchmark return for the corresponding 21 trading day periods is subtracted from the 
monthly raw return on each stock to give a monthly market-adjusted return. The 
average abnormal return for each month is computed by averaging the monthly market- 
adjusted return across all sample firms. In addition to examining CARs, wealth 
relatives are computed to compare the performance of various samples7.
7The market-adjusted return for stock i in event month t is given by arit= r^-r^. The average monthly 
market-adjusted return on the portfolio of n stocks for event month t is ARt= l/n [E iariJ , while t-statistics 
for the average monthly market-adjusted return are computed as T-STATl=ARt/sdt, where n, is the 
number of observations in month t and sd, is the cross-sectional standard deviation of AR,.
The cumulative market adjusted returns for event months 1 through 36 are given by CAR, ,=£,* 
AR,, with a t-statistic calculated as CT-STAT,=CAR, ,!tVnt/csd,, where csd,=[t*var+2*(t-l)covar]1^  with 
var being the average cross-sectional variance over 36 months and covar being the first order 
autocovariance of the AR, series.
The wealth relatives for month t are given by W threl=(l+CAR, ,{single or control 
firms})/(l +car,, {dual-class firms}).
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4.4.3 Market Microstructure and Insider Trading
The microstructure analysis is conducted using intraday transactions data for 
NYSE and AMEX IPOs from the Institute for the Study of Security Markets (ISSM) 
1985-88 files. For both dual and control samples on NYSE/AMEX, several market 
microstructure characteristics (e.g. quoted spreads, average trading volume, trade-to- 
trade price volatility, average trade size, adverse information component o f the spread) 
are studied for a period of 250 trading days following the IPO date.
Quoted dollar spreads are computed as the difference between the ask and bid 
quotes. Relative spreads are computed as (ask-bid/(ask+bid)/2). Trade-to-trade 
volatility at time t is computed as [(pricet - pricel.1)/pricet_1]2.
Using intraday trade prices and quotes, and following the models o f Stoll 
[1989], Huang and Stoll [1992], and Lin [1992], the following model is estimated for 
each firm:
a Qt+, =  Xzt +  e,+1 (1)
where: aQ1+1 =  Qt+1 - Qt
Qt =  log of the quote midpoint at time t
Zt = P, - Qt
P, =  log of the trade price at time t 
e,+l =  random error term.
In this model z,, which is the deviation of trade price from the prevailing quote 
midpoint is a measure of (one half of) the effective spread. The parameter X measures
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the effect of a trade at time t on the specialist’s quote revision at time t+ 1 . If  trades 
contain information and the specialist responds to them, a buy order (positive z,) should 
result in a subsequent upward revision of the quote midpoint. Similarly, a downward 
revision in the quote midpoint should follow a sell order (negative z j .  In theory (see 
Glosten and Milgrom [1985] and Easley and O’Hara [1987]) the larger the degree of 
adverse information facing the specialist or dealer, the larger should be the quoted 
spread and the larger should be the revisions in quotes in response to trades.
Finally, insider trading data is obtained from the ORS tapes provided by the 
SEC. Insider purchase activity is analyzed separately from insider sale activity. 
Purchases are restricted to open market purchases and the sales to open market sales. 
The nature of ownership must be direct. The term "insider" is used to include only the 
following relationships: chairman of the board, controlling person, director, director 
and beneficial owner o f more than 10% of a class o f the company equity security, 
officer, officer and director, officer of subsidiary, officer and treasurer, divisional 
officer, president, and vice president. Transactions that are either amended, reported 
late, or could not be reconciled with previous holdings are excluded. During their third 
year on the market following the IPO date, purchases and sales are aggregated across 
all the days for each firm, and then averaged across firms.
Chapter 5 
Empirical Results
5.1. Results on Underpricing
Tables 14, 15, and 16 list results for the initial period (using the offer price and 
the first available closing price). For the total samples (all exchanges), the dual-class 
sample is underpriced by 3.69%, which is significantly different from that o f 8.09% 
for the single-class at the 1 % level. This evidence suggests that single-class firms, on 
average, are characterized by more severe informational asymmetry compared to dual­
class firms. The first day underpricing of 5.86% for the control group is however 
closer to that for the dual-class and is not significantly different from it at the 5 % level. 
This evidence suggests that the control group firms, being similar to the dual-class 
firms in terms of offer date, industry and firm size, are also characterized by similar 
informational asymmetry as the dual-class firms. The lower underpricing and higher 
ownership retention for dual-class firms relative to control firms are consistent with the 
hypothesis that a higher cash-flow claim should result in lower ex-ante uncertainty and 
therefore in lower underpricing. Furthermore, while the underpricing remains more 
or less the same across the exchanges for the dual-class firms, it is much higher for the 
single as well as control group firms trading on NASDAQ. This comes as no surprise 
since firms trading on NASDAQ are on average smaller and could be characterized by 
more severe problems of asymmetric information.
The cross-sectional regression estimates are reported in Table 16. The overall 
regression is significant at the 1 % level. All eleven variables have the predicted signs.
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Table 14 
Initial Underpricing 
The average initial return is computed for the initial period (Month 
0) defined as the offering date to the first closing price listed on 
the CRSP daily NASDAQ and Amex-NYSE tapes.
Longrun Samples 
AVERAGE INITIAL RETURN 
(Standard Error)
N Amex-NYSE N NASDAQ N Total
Dual 32 0.0418
(0.0162)
66 0.0345
(0.0151)
98 0.0369
(0.0155)
Control 32 0.0127
(0.0013)
66 0.0808
(0.0248)
98 0.0586
(0.0182)
Single 221 0.0279
(0.0104)
1049 0.0921
(0.0583)
1270 0.0809
(0.0506)
Table 15
Initial Overpricing, Underpricing, and Exactpricing
IPO Type No. of 
Firms 
Overpriced
% of 
Total
No. of Firms 
Underpriced
% of 
Total
No. of 
Firms 
Exactpriced
% of 
Total
Dual
Amex-NYSE 7 21.88 19 59.37 6 18.75
NASDAQ 18 27.27 41 62.12 7 10.61
Total 25 25.51 60 61.22 13 13.27
Control
Amex-NYSE 10 31.25 12 37.50 10 31.25
NASDAQ 14 21.21 44 66.67 8 12.12
Total 24 24.49 56 57.14 18 18.37
Single
Amex-NYSE 46 20.81 89 40.27 86 38.92
NASDAQ 182 17.35 792 75.50 75 7.15
Total 228 17.95 881 69.37 161 12.68
Table 16
OLS Regression Results for Underpricing 
The cross-sectional regression model uses various proxies for ex- 
ante uncertainty, managerial disciplinary mechanisms, partial 
adjustment phenomenon, and a control variable for the equity 
structure.
Explanatory Variable Coefficient Estimated wil,s
Intercept 0.0574
Dual-class (D = l, 0 otherwise) -0.0062
Ownership Retention (OR) a 2 -0.0699*
Age (AGE) a 3 -0.0004
Reciprocal o f Gross Proceeds (RGP) <*4 0.4019***
Investment Banker (IB) (*s -0.0084
Auditor (AUD) Oi6 -0.0122
Exchange (EXCH) ct7 0.0031
Revision from Filing Price (CHPRC) 0.0113**
Revision from Shares Filed (CHSHR) a . 0.0002
Underwriter Compensation (UCOMP) «10 0.2307**
R2 0.2122
Adj. R2 0.1563
F-Value 3.7970***
Note: t-test applies for all. * significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 %, and *** significant at 1 %.
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The variables for equity structure, auditor, investment banker, exchange, change in 
shares offered from those filed, and age, though economically significant, are not 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The variables for investment banker and 
exchange are however significant in univariate regressions (not reported here). 
Significant collinearity is observed between IB (dummy variable equals 1 if  lead 
investment banker is among top ten as ranked by Institutional Investor) and UCOMP 
(underwriter compensation measured as a percent of the offer price), IB and RGP 
(reciprocal of the gross proceeds), OR (ownership retention) and AGE (measured from 
the date of incorporation to the offer date), EXCH (dummy variable for exchange 
equals 1 if firm trades on NASDAQ) and RGP, AUD (dummy variable equals 1 if 
auditor is among the big six) and CHPRC (percent revision in the offer price from the 
mid-point of the filing range), and CHSH (percent revision in the number o f shares 
offered from that filed) and RGP. As a result of the matching criteria, 88% of the 
control and 90% of the dual firms have a big-6 auditor, while 38% of the control and 
38% of the dual firms have a top-8 rank lead underwriter. The study finds evidence 
in support of the partial adjustment phenomenon from Hanley [1993]. Furthermore, 
the underpricing figures are lower than those documented in earlier research, which can 
be explained upon considering that the IPOs used in this study are cold issues. Within 
the framework of Benveniste and Spindt [1989] and Hanley [1993], an IPO is 
considered a cold issue if the firm revises the offer price and number of shares offered 
downward from the mid-point of the filing price range and number o f shares filed 
respectively.
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5.2. Results on Long-Run Stock-Price Performance
After three years of trading on the market all samples o f IPOs underperform the 
market index. The underperformance is similar to that reported by Ritter [1991] except 
that it appears to be less severe for the dual-class sample. The cumulative monthly 
average abnormal performance for three years is graphed in Figures 1-3 for various 
sub-samples based on the exchange on which the IPOs trade with the raw returns 
adjusted using both market indices (equally-weighted [EWRETD] and value-weighted 
[VWRETD]) for that exchange. The results are qualitatively identical for each 
benchmark choice. First qualitative results are presented in figures, then statistical 
results in tables.
Figure 1 sketches the CAR1>t for the dual-class NASDAQ and Amex-NYSE 
firms. The NASDAQ firms seem to fare much better than those on the Amex-NYSE. 
Figure 2 sketches the cumulative monthly average abnormal performance for all single­
class NASDAQ and Amex-NYSE firms. For this sample the NASDAQ firms seem to 
outperform the index during the initial few months. This evidence substantiates the 
underpricing result from Table 14 where the NASDAQ IPOs are underpriced by 
9.21%. The initial underpricing may partly explain the overperformance during the 
initial months on the market. Figure 3 sketches the cumulative monthly average 
abnormal performance for the control group NASDAQ and Amex-NYSE firms. Once 
again, the NASDAQ firms fare slightly better than those on the Amex-NYSE. 
Moreover, the control group firms perform much worse than the dual-class.
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The cumulative average matching-firm-adjusted returns for the subsamples based 
on the exchange on which the IPOs trade are graphed in Figure 4. A control firm is 
identified for each dual-class firm matched by exchange, offer date, industry and firm 
size. The monthly returns for the matching firm and the dual-class firm are adjusted 
using the value-weighted and equally-weighted indices of the respective exchange on 
which the firms trade, and the difference between the two gives the monthly matching 
firm-adjusted return, i.e. the matching-firm-adjusted return for stock i in event month 
t is computed as arit= [rDuiU it-rDual>mJ-triliatchiit-rMfltchimJ. Such computation helps take into 
account the difference between the offering date of a dual-class firm and that of its 
matching control firm. If any one of the two monthly returns is missing the 
corresponding observation is deleted. A positive cumulative average adjusted return 
indicates superior monthly market-adjusted returns for the dual-class IPOs. The dual­
class firms outperform the single-class firms during three years of trading subsequent 
to going public. The difference in performance is more pronounced for the NASDAQ 
firms compared to that for the Amex-NYSE8.
Figures 5 and 6 sketch the wealth relatives over three years for the single versus 
dual and control versus dual respectively. The profiles are almost identical. The dual­
class appears to do worse than the other two groups initially, but clearly outperforms 
them at the end of three years on the market. The initial underperformance, however, 
may be explained in part by the lower underpricing for the dual-class firms compared 
to the single class or the control group.
8 The discussion on reasons for differences in returns across the exchanges is left for another study.
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Figure 1. The Long-Run Performance of Dual-Class NASDAQ IPOs (adjusted
using NDQ EWRETD/VWRETD) and Amex-NYSE IPOs (adjusted using
Amex-NYSE EWRETD/VWRETD).
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Figure 2. The Long-Run Performance of All Single Class NASDAQ IPOs
(adjusted using NDQ EWRETD/VWRETD) and Amex-NYSE IPOs (adjusted
using Amex-NYSE EWRETD/VWRETD).
59
CONTROL GROUP IPOS
o
4
ij«3
-i
D
<
9
6
L
4
>
<
4
>
0
0. 2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 . 6
0.7
0 10 15 20 25 30 355
M onth o f  S e a s o n in g
EWRETD +  NDQ V T O D  O N Y S E / m  EWRETD A NfSE/AMEX VWRETD
Figure 3. The Long-Run Performance of All Single-Class Control NASDAQ
IPOs (adjusted using NDQ EWRETD/VWRETD) and Amex-NYSE IPOs
(adjusted using Amex-NYSE EWRETD/VWRETD).
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Figure 4. The Difference in the Long-Run Performance of Dual-Ciass and
Control Group NASDAQ IPOs (adjusted using NDQ EWRETD/VWRETD) and
Amex-NYSE IPOs (adjusted using Amex-NYSE EWRETD/VWRETD).
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Figure 5. The Wealth Relatives for 1270 Single-Class IPOs and 98 Dual-Class 
IPOs Computed as (l+ C A R l t {Single}) Divided by ( l+ C A R lit {Dual-Class}).
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Figure 6. The Wealth Relatives for 98 Single-Class Control IPOs and 98 Dual- 
Class IPOs Computed as (1+CARU {Control}) Divided by (l+ C A R lt {Dual- 
Class}).
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Table 17 reports the cumulative average abnormal returns, the difference in the 
cumulative average abnormal returns of the dual-class firms versus the single-class and 
the control groups, and the wealth relatives of the single or control groups compared 
to the dual-class firms. After-market underperformance is -20.05 % for the total single­
class, -8.5% for the dual-class, and -34.38% for the control group. The dual-class 
firms outperform the total single-class by 11.55% and the control group by 25.88%. 
Moreover, the wealth relatives are 87% for the total single-class and 71% for the 
control group when compared with the dual-class. While 37.14% of the monthly 
average abnormal returns are positive for the dual-class, only 17.14% are positive for 
the total single-class, and 28.57% are positive for the control group. All differences 
are statistically significant using parametric and non-parametric tests. A similar 
analysis is carried out for the sub-samples based on the exchange on which the IPOs 
trade. In general, the NASDAQ firms seem to perform better than the Amex-NYSE. 
The dual-class NASDAQ firms have an insignificant -1.77% underperformance. For 
both exchanges, the dual-class firms outperform the control group firms.
Table 18 provides the matching-firm-adjusted cumulative average abnormal 
returns for the dual-class sample. The results in table 18 suggest that upon adjusting 
each dual-class firm’s market-adjusted return with that of its matched single-class 
counterpart (both adjusted using the value-weighted NASDAQ market index), the dual­
class firms outperformed the single-class control group by 31.55% at the end of three 
years of trading on the market. In 25 out of 36 months dual-class firms had larger
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Table 17
Cumulative Average Abnormal R eturns for IPOs in  1984-88 
a t the End of 3 rd  Year on the M arket 
Nobs is the number of good observations for firms, CAR136 is the cumulative average 
abnormal return at the end of month 36, CT-STAT is the cross-sectional t-statistic for 
CAR1>36, ARt is the average abnormal return for month t, Cudiff is the difference in the 
CAR1>t and D iff is the difference in the ARt for the different samples.
Nobs CAR[36 CT-STAT %AR,>0 Cudiff1>36 Wthrel
(% Diff>0)
NYSE/AMEX
Single 196 -0.1771** -3.72 17.14
Dual 30 -0.3367* -2.24 25.71
Control 30 -0.5372” -3.83 25.71
Single-Dual 0.1597“ 1.24"
(62.86)
Control-Dual -0.2005" 0.69"
(54.28)
NASDAQ
Single 845 -0.2266" -6.65 17.14
Dual 53 -0.0177 -0.14 40.00
Control 65 -0.2959* -2.37 37.14
Single-Dual -0.2088” 0.79"
(37.14)
Control-Dual -0.2782" 0.71"
(37.14)
TOTAL
Single 1041 -0.2005" -6.88 17.14
Dual 83 -0.0850 -0.88 37.14
Control 96 -0.3438“ -3.56 28.57
Single-Dual -0.1155" 0.87“
(40.00)
Control-Dual -0.2588" 0.71“
(42.85)
Note: ’ significant at 5%, “  significant at 1 %.  For CAR’s t-test applies. For Cudiff and Wthrel Wilcoxon 
Sign Rank test applies. All CAR’s are also significant at 1 % using Wilcoxon Sign Rank test. The 
NYSE/AMEX samples are adjusted using NYSE/AMEX VWRETD, the NASDAQ samples are adjusted 
using NASDAQ VWRETD, and the total samples are adjusted using NASDAQ VWRETD. When other 
indices are used, the sample profiles remain similar and the differences in sample results become more 
pronounced.
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-------------------   T S K r a
M atching F irm  A djusted Cumulative Average A bnorm al R eturns 
Dual Class (adjusted using NDQ VWRETD) - Control Group (adjusted using NDQ 
VWRETD).
Month Nobs AR, T-Stat STD CAR, , CT-Stat Variance
1 96 0.00040 0.02351 0.16869 0.00040 0.01903 0.02846
2 95 0.01677 1.22696 0.13325 0.01718 0.56750 0.04621
3 96 -0.00775 -0.26516 0.28626 0.00943 0.25565 0.12816
4 96 0.00100 0.04753 0.20576 0.01043 0.24479 0.17049
5 97 0.01586 0.86678 0.18026 0.02629 0.55481 0.20299
6 97 0.03074 1.58178 0.19141 0.05704 1.09852 0.23963
7 97 0.00661 0.30415 0.21404 0.06365 1.13484 0.28544
8 97 0.04398 1.98461 0.21826 0.10763 1.79503 0.33308
9 97 -0.01293 -0.80354 0.15848 0.09470 1.48902 0.35819
10 96 -0.02234 -1.24178 0.17629 0.07235 1.07372 0.38927
11 96 0.01097 0.65984 0.16296 0.08333 1.17902 0.41583
12 96 0.00061 0.03043 0.19748 0.08394 1.13711 0.45482
13 96 0.03264 1.91643 0.16689 0.11659 1.51732 0.48267
14 96 0.01810 0.71723 0.24725 0.13468 1.68909 0.54381
15 96 0.01122 0.64928 0.16936 0.14591 1.76778 0.57249
16 94 0.00683 0.33121 0.19996 0.15274 1.77300 0.61247
17 93 0.03403 1.83673 0.17867 0.18677 2.09206 0.64440
18 92 0.03641 1.75424 0.19908 0.22318 2.41635 0.68403
19 91 -0.00089 -0.04144 0.20396 0.22229 2.32979 0.72563
20 91 -0.00548 -0.32513 0.16079 0.21681 2.21480 0.75148
21 91 -0.00036 -0.02190 0.15878 0.21645 2.15778 0.77669
22 92 0.00310 0.17464 0.17006 0.21954 2.15004 0.80561
23 91 0.00316 0.13790 0.21825 0.22270 2.12136 0.85324
24 90 0.02536 1.41885 0.16960 0.24806 2.30048 0.88201
25 90 0.05483 1.44599 0.35971 0.30289 2.75217 1.01140
26 90 0.00478 0.20022 0.22635 0.30767 2.74128 1.06263
27 88 0.02496 1.10670 0.21157 0.33263 2.87576 1.10739
28 86 0.00990 0.34306 0.26749 0.34252 2.87471 1.17894
29 86 0.00215 0.08341 0.23914 0.34467 2.84244 1.23613
30 85 -0.00959 -0.40164 0.22008 0.33509 2.70108 1.28456
31 84 -0.00320 -0.18435 0.15924 0.33188 2.61623 1.30992
32 83 -0.00506 -0.25276 0.18222 0.32683 2.52065 1.34312
33 82 -0.00027 -0.01144 0.21578 0.32655 2.46511 1.38968
34 81 0.00281 0.15973 0.15846 0.32937 2.43451 1.41479
35 80 -0.01382 -0.57513 0.21492 0.31555 2.28457 1.46098
The NASDAQ VWRETD has been used because most IPOs trade on the NASDAQ. The use of other 
benchmarks does not qualitatively change the results.
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returns. The cross-sectional standard deviations for the monthly firm-adjusted returns 
vary from a low of 13.33% in month 2 to a high of 35.97% in month 25.
The frequency distribution of holding period returns for the control group versus 
the dual-class at the end of each of the first three years o f trading is shown in Table 19. 
The holding period return is computed as 0 (1  -t-Ret,) - 1.0]. The wealth relatives 
(Wthrel) are computed as [(1 +  holding period retumcootrol) /( l +holding period retumdlMl)]. 
Given the percentiles, the dual-class appears to have superior performance compared 
to the control group.
5.3. Results on Operating Performance
To corroborate the stock-price performance results, the study also analyzes 
several measures of operating performance using accounting data from 1990 and 1991 
COMPUSTAT files for dual-class and control firms at the end of three years on the 
market. Several profitability, liquidity, and asset utilization ratios are computed for 
both samples. The accounting measures are derived for each firm and then averaged 
across the firms. Furthermore, to check if  there exist differences in performance across 
trading locations, the accounting variables of information are derived for the dual and 
control samples by exchange.
The results based on accounting figures, reported in Table 20 are consistent with 
the results on stock-price performance. It is found that dual-class firms substantially 
outperform single-class control firms. The dual-class firms outperform the control 
firms not only at the end of three years on the market, but during each of the three 
years of trading. For brevity, the study only presents results at the end of the third
Table 19 
Holding Period R eturns
YEARl YEAR2 YEAR3
Control Dual Wthrel Control Dual Wthrel Control Dual Wthrel
NYSE/AMEX
100
99
95
90
75
50
25
10
5
1
0
1.1197 1
1.1197 1 
1.1084 1 
0.5948 0. 
0.1621 0 
-0.0738 -0, 
-0.3300 -0. 
-0.4760 -0. 
-0.6406 -0. 
-0.9591 -0. 
-0.9591 -0.
.1479 0.9868 
.1479 0.9868 
.0361 1.0354 
,4395 1.1078 
.0821 1.0739 
.1963 1.1524 
.4126 1.1406 
,4915 1.0305 
.5247 0.7562 
,5793 0.0970 
5793 0.0970
1.0167
1.0167 
0.6026 
0.2033 
0.1759 
-0.1920-0 
-0.4481 -0. 
-0.6888 -0 . 
-0.7891 -0. 
-0.9592 -0. 
-0.9592 -0.
.7712 0.5347 
.7712 0.5347 
.2568 0.4920 
9898 0.4024 
.4575 0.8067 
.2558 1.0857 
.6029 1.3902 
.7030 1.0492 
.7539 0.8573 
7623 0.1717 
7623 0.1717
0.8403 6 
0.8403 6 
0.6882 4 
0.5820 1 
0.2068 0 
-0.1518-0. 
-0.6667-0. 
-0.7566 -0. 
-0.9282 -0. 
-0.9592 -0. 
-0.9592 -0.
.20200.2555 
.2020 0.2555 
.7499 0.2936 
9781 0.5311 
.5636 0.7717 
.3211 1.2494 
.6774 1.0334 
.7857 1.1359 
.9166 0.8617 
9572 0.9546 
9572 0.9546
Mean
Q3-Q1
-0.0123-0.0848 1.0792 
0.4921 0.4947 0.9982
-0.1566 0.0884 0.7767 
0.5274 1.0605 0.7412
-0.1686 0.2991 0.6399 
0.8735 1.2411 0.8359
NASDAQ
100
99
95
90
75
50
25
10
5
1
0
2.0242 1
2.0242 1 
1.0326 1 
0.8657 0 
0.2075 0 
-0.2141 0 
-0.4898 -0 
-0.5773 -0 
-0.6976 -0 
-0.8023 -0 
-0.8023 -0
.46601.2263 
.46601.2263 
.0588 0.9873 
9165 0.9734 
.4990 0.8054 
.0518 0.7470 
.21310.6483 
.5831 1.0138 
.7023 1.0157 
8974 1.9273 
.8974 1.9273
1.1949
1.1949 
1.1217 
0.7353 
0.0243 
-0.2628 
-0.6302 
-0.7814 
-0.8837 
-0.9556 
-0.9556
3.1220 0.5324
3.1220 0.5324 
1.5923 0.8184 
1.1963 0.7900 
0.6399 0.6246 
-0.0067 0.7420 
-0.3580 0.5759 
-0.7439 0.8533 
-0.8386 0.7204 
-0.9878 3.6390 
-0.9878 3.6390
2.8336
2.8336 
0.8761 
0.8139 
0.1970 
-0.2715 -0 
-0.7110-0 
-0.8588 -0 
-0.8662 0 
-0.9709 -0 
-0.9709 -0,
.9606 0.7728 
.9606 0.7728 
.9895 0.6275 
6614 0.6815 
.8993 0.6302 
.0100 0.7358 
.3086 0.4179 
.8481 0.9291 
.9407 2.2570 
.9878 2.3847 
9878 2.3847
Mean
Q3-Q1
-0.0756 0.0917 0.8467 -0.1876 0.20810.6724 -0.1434 0.2829 0.6676 
0.6973 0.7122 0.9912 0.6545 0.9979 0.8281 0.9080 1.2080 0.8641
TOTAL
100
99
95
90
75
50
25
10
5
1
0
Mean
Q3-Q1
2.0242 1
2.0242 1 
1.1084 1 
0.6055 0, 
0.1705 0, 
-0.1282-0. 
-0.4719 -0. 
-0.5625 -0. 
-0.6976 -0. 
-0.9591 -0, 
-0.9591 -0.
.4660 1.2263 
.46601.2263 
.0588 1.0241 
7108 0.9384 
34370.8711 
0333 0.9018 
3393 0.7993 
5247 0.9206 
6586 0.8857 
8974 0.3980 
8974 0.3980
1.1949 3
1.1949 3 
1.0167 2 
0.5080 1 
0.1527 0 
-0.2485 -0 
-0.5361 -0 
-0.7815 -0 
-0.8837 -0 
-0.9592 -0 
-0.9592 -0
.1220 0.5324 
12200.5324 
.1132 0.6478 
.2684 0.6647 
6083 0.7166 
.1120 0.8462 
.4201 0.8000 
.7439 0.8533 
.7976 0.5745 
9878 3.3486 
.9878 3.3486
2.8336 6
2.8336 6 
0.8592 2 
0.6460 1 
0.1970 0 
-0.2704 -0, 
-0.6826 -0, 
-0.8589 -0, 
-0.9282 -0. 
-0.9709 -0, 
-0.9709 -0,
.2020 0.5323 
.2020 0.5323 
.2152 0.5782 
7064 0.6081 
7041 0.7024 
1068 0.8168 
4189 0.5462 
8360 0.8609 
9407 1.2121 
9878 2.3847 
9878 2.3847
-0.0550 0.0340 0.9065 
0.6425 0.6831 0.9758
-0.1775 0.1690 0.7041 -0.1518 0.2882 0.6515 
0.6888 1.0285 0.8325 0.8796 1.1231 0.8853
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Table 20
Perform ance M easures and  Summary Statistics using Accounting D ata for 
Dual and  M atching Control Firms a t the E nd of Y ear 3 on the M arket 
72 dual-class firms (32 on Amex-NYSE and 40 on NASDAQ), and 78 matching 
control firms are identified on COMPUSTAT 1991 tapes.
Performance Measures N Mean
(Yr3)
% Growth 
from Yr 1
25%
(Yr3)
50%
(Yr3)
75%
(Yr3)
Operating IncomefTotal assets: Dual 67 0.135 -25.00 0.072 0.130 0.185
Control 71 0.076 -40.63 0.030 0.071 0.129
Operating Income/Stockholders Equity: Dual 64 0.734 -4.92 0.172 0.344 0.630
Control 70 0.255 -49.30 0.113 0.224 0.376
Operating Income/Net Sales: Dual 65 0.188 1.08 0.073 0.134 0.235
Control 71 0.124 100.28 0.035 0.083 0.175
EPS (primary, excl extraord items): Dual 68 0.184 -73.94 -0.120 0.460 1.170
Control 70 0.094 -75.65 -0.270 0.170 0.810
Market Value/Total Assets: Dual 67 2.039 83.69 0.364 0.771 1.206
Control 71 0.782 -37.54 0.236 0.510 0.985
Tobin’s Q: Dual 67 2.765 59.46 1.054 1.429 1.974
Control 71 1.398 -21.86 0.972 1.136 1.464
Market Value/Common Equity: Dual 67 3.817 -3.61 0.909 1.721 2.923
Control 71 2.398 -29.64 0.837 1.307 1.930
Total Debt/Total Assets: Dual 68 0.328 11.19 0.079 0.257 0.502
Control 71 0.218 27.98 0.023 0.169 0.316
Total Liab./Total Assets: Dual 68 0.712 10.90 0.434 0.641 0.863
Control 71 0.603 10.24 0.446 0.638 0.802
Current Assets/Current Liab.: Dual 60 3.481 55.54 1.325 1.899 3.244
Control 60 2.390 -14.55 1.059 1.703 3.199
Net Sales/Total Assets: Dual 68 2.293 85.22 0.492 1.011 1.703
Control 70 1.267 12.72 0.565 1.064 1.528
Market Value of Equity (mill $): Dual 67 420.034 70.84 35.356 96.219 326.006
Control 71 148.033 10.91 11.134 31.175 100.391
Total Assets (mill $): Dual 68 495.078 57.67 66.653 142.719 566.342
Control 71 623.111 34.01 25.883 76.264 205.442
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year on the market. Once again, consistent with the stock-price performance results, 
the accounting performance results are not sensitive to the exchange on which the IPOs 
trade. For both NASDAQ and Amex-NYSE, the dual-class firms outperform the 
control firms during each of the three years of trading on the market. Tables 21 and 
22 report the accounting figures aggregated by exchange for the dual and control 
samples trading on NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ respectively. The dual-class firms on 
either exchange outperform the single-class firms at the end of three years on the 
market. Moreover, similar to the stock-price results, the IPOs on NASDAQ appear to 
fare better than those on NYSE or AMEX.
From Table 20, on average, the dual-class firms are considerably more 
leveraged (Total Debt/Total Assets=32.8%) than the control firms (the same ratio 
being 21.8%). This suggests that long-term debt may serve as a disciplinary 
mechanism to align managerial incentives of dual-class managers to those o f outside 
stockholders. Furthermore, these firms may have exhausted their debt capacity before 
turning to the common equity market for additional financing. All profitability, 
liquidity, asset utilization, and other accounting ratios suggest that on average, dual­
class firms are twice as profitable as the single-class control firms. An approximate 
proxy for Tobin’s Q has been computed using the definition from Mikkelson and Partch 
[1992]. On average, for the dual and control samples respectively, the return on assets 
(ROA) is 0.135 and 0.076, the return on equity (ROE) is 0.734 and 0.255, the return 
on sales (ROS) is 0.188 and 0.124, the primary earnings per share (EPS) is 0.184 and 
0.094, and Tobin’s Q is 2.765 and 1.398.
Table 21
Performance Measures and Summary Statistics using 
Accounting Data for NYSE/AMEX Dual and Matching 
Control Firms at the End of Year 3 on the Market
Performance Measures Mean
(Yr3)
25%
(Yr3)
50%
(Yr3)
75%
(Yr3)
Operating Income/Total assets: Dual 0.136 0.063 0.115 0.173
Control 0.107 0.023 0.112 0.156
Operating Income/Stockholders Equity: Dual 0.660 0.159 0.343 0.722
Control 0.358 0.177 0.283 0.381
Operating Income/Net Sales: Dual 0.199 0.093 0.128 0.252
Control 0.146 0.023 0.099 0.166
EPS (primary, excl extraord items): Dual 0.043 -0.160 0.425 1.000
Control 0.097 -0.250 0.300 1.030
Market Value/Total Assets: Dual 0.625 0.170 0.447 1.011
Control 0.486 0.232 0.426 0.579
Tobin’s Q: Dual 1.288 0.984 1.225 1.446
Control 1.164 0.954 1.090 1.235
Market Value/Common Equity: Dual 2.426 0.747 1.493 2.306
Control 1.556 0.712 1.199 1.814
Total Debt/Total Assets: Dual 0.308 0.109 0.248 0.526
Control 0.269 0.111 0.232 0.393
Total Liab./Total Assets: Dual 0.660 0.513 0.649 0.866
Control 0.675 0.514 0.664 0.825
Current Assets/Current Liab.: Dual 1.900 1.293 1.475 2.317
Control 1.891 1.123 1.319 2.898
Net Sales/Total Assets: Dual 1.083 0.517 0.949 1.561
Control 1.351 0.697 1.253 1.845
Market Value of Equity (mill $): Dual 285.372 32.896 57.231 254.130
Control 336.570 19.166 37.122 138.359
Total Assets (mill $): Dual 590.532 80.201 192.320 683.653
Control 1240.03 63.479 102.110 338.358
Table 22
Performance Measures and Summary Statistics using 
Accounting Data for NASDAQ Dual and Matching Control 
Firms at the End of Year 3 on the Market
Performance Measures Mean
(Yr3)
25%
(Yr3)
50%
(Yr3)
75%
(Yr3)
Operating Income/Total assets: Dual 0.134 0.078 0.153 0.220
Control 0.063 0.032 0.069 0.106
Operating Income/Stockholders Equity: Dual 0.788 0.249 0.359 0.534
Control 0.209 0.109 0.196 0.376
Operating Income/Net Sales: Dual 0.179 0.073 0.162 0.215
Control 0.114 0.036 0.075 0.183
EPS (primary, excl extraord items): Dual 0.306 -0.120 0.630 1.510
Control 0.189 -0.050 0.200 0.790
Market Value/Total Assets: Dual 3.186 0.549 0.955 2.027
Control 0.903 0.256 0.728 1.037
Tobin’s Q: Dual 3.963 1.170 1.615 2.236
Control 1.494 0.975 1.185 1.491
Market Value/Common Equity: Dual 5.045 1.264 2.234 3.692
Control 2.776 0.882 1.446 1.949
Total Debt/Total Assets: Dual 0.345 0.060 0.257 0.502
Control 0.195 0.009 0.094 0.282
Total Liab./Total Assets: Dual 0.753 0.388 0.596 0.826
Control 0.571 0.372 0.604 0.774
Current Assets/Current Liab.: Dual 4.716 1.380 2.275 3.801
Control 2.612 1.059 1.778 3.613
Net Sales/Total Assets: Dual 3.248 0.423 0.998 1.771
Control 1.231 0.554 0.946 1.473
Market Value of Equity (mill $): Dual 538.853 39.659 149.473 361.004
Control 63.384 10.510 24.415 61.974
Total Assets (mill $): Dual 413.260 21.966 113.271 371.001
Control 346.128 17.596 48.229 147.144
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5.4. Results from Liquidity Analysis
Table 23 provides summary statistical data at the time of IPO for the samples 
of dual-class and single-class control firms used in this part of the study. While 
average offer prices per share are similar for the single and dual samples ($12.24 and 
$12.65 respectively), the offer amount (as well as primary and secondary share 
offerings) of $137.88 million is significantly higher for the single compared to $49.66 
million for the dual. The single-class sample has, in comparison with the dual-class, 
significantly higher dilution (40% versus 26%), lower price to book ratio on the first 
trading day (3.01 versus 4.15), similar gross spread (management fee, underwriting fee 
and selling concession) paid to the underwriting syndicate ($.80 versus $0.85), and 
similar age as measured from the date of incorporation to the offer date (21.68 versus 
23.06 years). While both samples appear to be cold issues, the dual-class seems colder 
than the single as measured by the percent change from the mid-filing-price to the offer 
price (-8.56% versus -6.72%), and the percent change in the number of shares filed to 
that offered9 (-7.96% versus 21.87%). Average firm size for the single-class is $365 
million, while it is $318 million for the dual-class (assuming that the superior voting 
stock trades at the same price as the inferior voting stock). By construction the 
matched control firms have average firm sizes that are very close to those of dual-class 
firms.
Table 24 provides summary statistical data on the microstructure characteristics 
of the two samples for the first 250 days of trading in the aftermarket period. Values
9 See Hanley [1993] for a recent review of the partial adjustment phenomenon.
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Table 23
Descriptive Statistics on 30 Single (Control) and Dual-Class IPOs between
1985-88 at Time of IPO
Single Dual
Variable of Interest Mean Median Std Mean Median Std
$ Offer Amount (mill) 137.88 32.40 305.30 49.66 29.70 66.26
Offer Price Per Share ($) 12.24 10.00 5.54 12.65 13.38 3.56
Tot Shares Offered (mill) 8.46 3.00 14.98 3.96 2.45 5.52
Primary Shares Offered (mill) 6.14 2.70 12.67 3.39 2.03 5.67
Secondary Shares Offered (mill) 2.32 0.00 9.64 0.57 0.07 1.01
ShareB O/S before IPO (mill) 16.71 4.61 27.67 12.76 6.97 20.40
Shares O/S after IPO (mill) 23.05 9.48 34.13 17.66 9.20 27.36
Dilution % 40.03 29.60 28.55 25.99 23.55 18.79
Age 21.58 6.00 27.88 23.06 9.00 26.63
Mlct Val after Offer (mill) 365.25 101.90 646.27 318.14 116.85 369.41
Price/Book Ratio after Offer 3.01 2.98 2.00 4.15 2.92 4.60
Book/Price Ratio after Offer 0.53 0.34 0.41 0.39 0.34 0.24
Gross Spread ($) 0.80 0.70 0.27 0.85 0.91 0.22
Mgmt. Fee ($) 0.16 0.14 0.06 0.18 0.19 0.05
Under. Fee ($) 0.17 0.17 0.06 0.19 0.18 0.06
Sell. Cone. ($) 0.46 0.42 0.17 0.49 0.50 0.12
Stock Price Filing - Low ($) 11.91 10.00 4.35 12.82 13.00 3.25
Stock Price Filing - High ($) 13.77 12.00 4.95 14.85 15.00 3.79
% Chng Mid File Price to Offer -6.72 0.00 13.05 -8.56 -7.95 13.08
Total Shares Filed (mill) 7.44 3.70 12.77 4.25 2.95 4.96
% Chng Shares Filed to Offer 21.87 0.00 158.66 -7.96 0.00 18.21
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Table 24
Averages of Daily Estimates (using Intraday Data) over 250 Trading 
Days Subsequent to the IPO for 30 Single and Dual-Class IPOs
between 1985-88
Single Dual
Variable of Interest Mean Std.
E rror
Mean Std.
E rro r
Trade Size (00’s shares) 14.36 0.2483 13.44** 0.3342
Daily Number of Trades 31.32 1.0160 17.57*“ 0.4434
Daily Share Volume (00’s shares) 667.71 45.96 279.65“* 14.23
Turnover Ratio 0.0029 0.000089 0.0045*** 0.00041
Dollar Spread ($) 0.2007 0.0008 0.2095*** 0.0008
Relative Spread (%) 2.23 0.0002 1.98*** 0.0001
Effective Relative Spread (%) 1.90 0.000194 1.56*** 0.00012
Adverse Information Component (%) 31.53 3.63 39.67 2.81
Trade-to-trade Price Volatility 0.00021 0.000007 0.00014“ * 0.000005
STote: Estimates are based on all but opening trades.
*, **, indicates significantly different from the single-class IPO sample at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1 % level respectively.
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in the table are computed by averaging daily values for each firm over the 250 trading 
days and then averaging across firms. Average daily share volume and daily number 
of trades range from 66,771 shares per day and 31 trades respectively for the single­
class firms to 27,965 shares per day and 18 trades for the dual-class firms. This 
appears to be largely a function of the size of the public float (number of shares of the 
total outstanding that actually publicly trade) for the two different samples.
Dollar spreads are lower for the single-class firms, averaging $0.20, compared 
to $0.21 for the dual. Average relative spreads, average effective spreads (measured 
as the deviation of trade price from the prevailing quote midpoint), average trade size 
and average trade-to-trade price volatility, however, are significantly higher for the 
single-class sample (2.23%, 1.9%, 1,436 shares and 0.00021 respectively) relative to 
those for the dual-class (1.98%, 1.56%, 1,344 shares and 0.00014 respectively). 
Moreover, the turnover ratio (share volume/number of shares outstanding and publicly 
traded) is significantly lower for the single-class firms (0.0029) compared to the dual­
class (0.0045). The average estimate of the adverse information component of the 
effective spread10 is 31.53% (average t-statistic =  31.81) for the single vote shares, 
which is not significantly different from 39.67% (average t-statistic =  32.14) for the 
dual vote shares at the 10% level. By these measures, the dual-class firms appear to
10 Using intraday trade prices and quotes, and following the models of Stoll [1989], Huang and Stoll 
[1992], and Lin [1992]), the following model is estimated for each firm: 
a Ql+1 =  Xz, + e1+1
where: aQ1+1 = Q,+i '  Q,
Q, = log of the quote midpoint at time t
A = P, - Q,
P, =  log of the trade price at time t 
e1+, =  random error term.
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enjoy better liquidity in the IPO aftermarket than single-class firms. However, there 
are factors known to affect the magnitude of bid-ask spreads that are not controlled for 
by these univariate tests. Therefore, the study next considers tests that control for other 
factors.
In the spirit of past work which shows that relative bid-ask spreads are 
negatively related to share price and trading activity, and positively related to risk or 
volatility (e.g. Benston and Hagerman [1974], Demsetz [1968], Hamilton [1976], Tinic 
[1972] and Mclnish and Wood [1992]), the study regresses average relative bid-ask 
spreads on average daily share price, average daily trading volume and average daily 
variance of return for a pooled sample of dual-class and control firms. The values of 
all variables are 5-day weekly averages during the 250 day aftermarket period for each 
firm. A dummy variable in the regression takes on the value of one for the dual-class 
firms. This variable should capture any differences in bid-ask spreads between dual­
class and single-class firms after controlling for known determinants of the spread.
The results of the regression analysis are reported in Table 25. Three 
specifications of the independent variables (linear, log-linear and square root) are tried 
to examine robustness of the results. All of the regressions are highly significant, 
explaining an average of 50 to 72 percent of the cross sectional variation in relative 
spreads using various functional forms. The explanatory variables all have the 
hypothesized signs and are significant at the 1 percent level in each regression. The 
intercept dummy variable is negative and highly significant, thus implying that after 
controlling for share price, trading volume and variance of return there are statistically
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Table 25
Regression Analysis of Bid-Ask Spreads, Share Price, Trading Volume, 
and Daily Return Variance for Single and Dual-Class IPOs between 1985- 
88 using Intraday Data Averaged over 5-Day Weeks
Regression Parameters Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 0.04
(87.22)
0.08
(85.13)
0.05
(73.64)
Intercept Dummy (1 if Dual) -0.004
(-10.37)
-0.002
(-6.99)
-0.003
(-9.05)
Share Price -0.001
(-42.54)
-0.018
(-57.61)
-0.009
(-47.34)
Trading Volume -0.0000002
(-1.95)
-0.0007
(-7.00)
-0.00006
(-4.68)
Return Variance 0.66
(12.99)
0.001
(13.94)
0.11
(16.71)
R2 0.50 0.72 0.63
F-Statistic 612 1518 1014
'Jote: t-statistics are in parentheses.
Model 1 takes the linear functional form.
Model 2 uses the natural logarithms of the independent variables.
Model 3 uses the square roots of the independent variables.
The results do not change qualitatively for other variants of the functional form or when daily 
number of trades is used instead of trading volume.
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significant differences in the bid-ask spreads of dual-class versus single-class IPOs (the 
spreads, ceteris paribus, being smaller by as much as ten percent for dual-class shares).
To ensure that the results are not sensitive to the time frame used for 
aggregating data, the study performs similar analyses on a quarterly and monthly basis 
and finds that irrespective of the time frame used, the differences between the samples 
remain significant, persistent, and in the same direction. Table 26 reports quarterly 
averages of estimates during the four quarters of aftermarket trading. During each of 
the quarters, the average relative spread and intratrade price volatility remain 
significantly higher while the turnover ratio remains significantly lower for the single­
class firms in comparison to the dual. The average trade size is significantly higher for 
the single-class firms only in the first two quarters, but is not significantly different 
from that for the dual-class firms in the third and fourth quarters. Consistent with the 
study of Hegde and Miller [1989], quoted spreads increase over time following the IPO 
date.
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Table 26
Quarterly Averages of Daily Estimates (using Intraday Data) over 250 
Trading Days Subsequent to the IPO for 30 Single and Dual-Class IPOs
between 1985-88
Variable of Interest Quarter Q uarter 2 Quarter Quarter 4
1 3
Panel A: Single-dass IPOs
Relative Spread (%) 1.82 2.18 2.45 2.59
Trade-to-trade Price Volatility 0.00012 0.00021 0.00025 0.00030
Trade Size (00’s shares) 16.91 13.91 12.86 13.24
Turnover Ratio 0.0044 0.0024 0.0025 0.0020
Adverse Information Component (%) 32.02 40.15 42.21 35.41
Panel B: Dual-class IPOs
Relative Spread (%) 1.72“ 2.01“ 2.06“ 2.20“
Trade-to-trade Price Volatility 0.00011* 0.00014“ 0.00017“ * 0.00016“
Trade Size (00’s shares) 14.65*** 12.55* 13.26 13.28
Turnover Ratio 0.0093*** 0.0031*** 0.0030“ 0.0029“
Adverse Information Component ( %) 39.83 44.86 45.55 42.32
Vote: Estimates are based on all but opening trades.
*, **, *** indicates significantly different from the single-class IPO sample at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1 % level respectively.
The results do not change qualitatively upon doing a similar analysis on a monthly basis.
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The first ten days of the IPO aftermarket trading history are potentially 
interesting because they comprise the underwriter support period during which price 
stabilization activity by the underwriters may occur. This is also a period marked on 
average by severe informational asymmetry, greater price volatility, and increased 
trading activity (Hegde and Miller [1989]). From the view-point of the investor, this 
is the most important period for which the results of this research would have practical 
relevance and provide him/her with valuable insight. To capture initial differences in 
the microstructure characteristics between the samples, if  any, the study reports the 
averages of daily estimates for the underwriter support period in Table 27, and for the 
first trading day alone in Table 28. The differences in liquidity variables described in 
Tables 24 and 26 are found to be present from the first day of public trading. 
Moreover, the first trading day witnesses unusually high levels of trading volume and 
volatility, and lower levels for the adverse information component o f the spread for 
both samples of firms.
To provide a visual summary of how the various microstructure variables season 
following the IPO date, Figures 7 through 15 show the 5-day weekly averages of 
intraday trade price, average trade size, average dollar spreads, trade-to-trade volatility, 
average relative spreads, average number of trades per day, average daily volume, 
average turnover ratio, and the adverse information component of the spread 
respectively over the 250 days of trading subsequent to the IPO. In support of the 
differences outlined previously in various tables, the study finds that for the entire 
aftermarket period, average relative spread, average trade-to-trade volatility, and
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Table 27
Averages of Daily Estimates (using Intraday Data) over the First 10 Trading 
Days Subsequent to the IPO for 30 Single and Dual-Class IPOs between
1985-88
Single Dual
Variable of Interest Mean Std. E rror Mean Std. E rro r
Share Price ($) 11.64 0.3673 13.31** 0.2598
Dollar Spread ($) 0.1547 0.0022 0.1614** 0.0028
Relative Spread (%) 1.55 0.0004 1.33*** 0.0003
Trade-to-trade Price Volatility 0.00008 0.000007 0.00005*** 0.000005
Trade Size (00’s shares) 20.95 1.1947 20.13 1.0899
Turnover Ratio 0.0139 0.0018 0.0340“ 0.0098
Adverse Information Component (%) 20.24 0.03 22.43 0.03
'Tote: Estimates are based on all but opening trades.
*, **, *** indicates significantly different from the single-class IPO sample at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1 % level respectively.
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Table 28
Averages (using Intraday Data) over the First Trading Day Subsequent to 
the IPO for 30 Single and Dual-Class IPOs between 1985-88
Single Dual
Variable of Interest Mean Std. E rro r Mean Std. E rro r
Share Price ($) 11.66 1.1599 13.18 0.7191
Dollar Spread ($) 0.1452 0.0050 0.1494 0.0076
Relative Spread (%) 1.48 0.0011 1.22* 0.0008
Trade-to-trade Price Volatility 0.000138 0.000057 0.00004* 0.000009
Trade Size (00’s shares) 41.64 6.48 37.35 4.80
Turnover Ratio 0.06 0.01 0.21 0.09
Adverse Information Component (%) 13.54 0.02 11.74*“ 0.03
'Tote; Estimates are based on all but opening trades.
*, **, *** indicates significantly different from the single-class IPO sample at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1 % level respectively.
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Figure 7. Weekly Averages of Daily Estimates of Intraday Price for 30 Single
and Dual-Class IPOs.
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Figure 8. Weekly Averages of Daily Estimates of Intraday Trade Size (OO’s
Shares) for 30 Single and Dual-Class IPOs.
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Figure 9. Weekly Averages of Daily Estimates of Intraday Dollar Spreads for
30 Single and Dual-Class IPOs.
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Figure 10. Weekly Averages of Daily Estimates of Intraday Trade-to-Trade
Volatility for 30 Single and Dual-Class IPOs.
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Figure 11. Weekly Averages of Daily Estimates of Intraday Relative Spreads for
30 Single and Dual-Class IPOs.
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Figure 12. Weekly Averages of Daily Estimates of Intraday Number of Trades
for 30 Single and Dual-Class IPOs.
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Figure 13. Weekly Averages of Daily Estimates of Total Volume for 30 Single
and Dual-Class IPOs.
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and Dual-Class IPOs.
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Component for 30 Single and Dual-Class IPOs.
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average trade size remain consistently higher while average turnover ratio remains 
consistently lower for single-class firms compared to dual-class. Furthermore, as the 
IPO stocks season, average relative spread, average trade-to-trade volatility, and the 
adverse information component of the spread increase over time, while the average 
trade size and average turnover ratio decrease during the initial days but then remain 
fairly constant. These trends are also easy to follow using the quarterly averages from 
Table 24.
Next, the study documents differences in insider trading activity during the first 
three years of trading after going public between the single and dual-class samples as 
reported by the ORS tapes supplied by the SEC. The results are reported in Table 29. 
One does not expect to find insider trades for the first 180-270 days following the IPO 
date depending on the individual firm’s lock-up period during which no insider trades 
are allowed. Consistent with previous studies of insider trading, the average amount 
of insider purchases is considerably lower than the average amount of insider sales for 
either sample. The average number of insiders, however, are twice as many on the buy 
side compared to the sell side. While the average amount o f insider sales is similar for 
both samples, the insider activity on the buy side for dual-class firms is almost twice 
that of single-class firms. This study interprets similar insider sales after the expiry of 
the lock-up period but higher insider purchases for the dual-class firms as a positive 
signal of superior firm quality.
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Table 29
Insider Trading Estimates over the First 3 Years of Trading 
Subsequent to the IPO for 30 Single and Dual-Class IPOs between
1985-88
Single Dual
Variable of Interest Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Insider Purchases
Number of Firms 21 19
Average Trade Size ($) 12,116 8454 24,538 36,397
Average Number of Insiders 4.81 2.82 4.53 2.48
Average Number of Trades 10.90 8.31 17.95 22.93
Insider Sales
Number of Firms 14 18
Average Trade Size ($) 126,047 286,825 145,177 349,655
Average Number of Insiders 2.00 1.10 2.61 1.61
Average Number of Trades 7.36 11.94 7.44 7.89
Note: Estimates are based on data from the ORS tapes.
*, **, *** indicates significantly different from the single-class IPO sample at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1 % level respectively.
C hapter 6 
Summ ary and  Concluding Rem arks
This study examines the importance of equity structure choice by management 
in the case of IPOs. It identifies and presents some motives for a dual-class equity 
structure at the time of IPO, and determines the resultant impact on initial underpricing, 
subsequent after-market pricing, firm value, insider trading, and related market 
microstructure issues. Specifically, it analyzes the underpricing and long-run 
performance of dual-class IPOs where control is concentrated in the hands of 
management, and compares it with that for single-class IPOs. For the sample of all 
dual-class IPOs in the 1980s, this study finds no statistically significant abnormal long- 
run performance over a three year horizon. This contrasts with Ritter’s [1991] result 
that regular IPOs significantly underperform in the three years after going public.
Various studies have examined underpricing and long-run performance of IPOs. 
No study, however, has examined the underpricing, long-run performance, or market 
microstructure characteristics o f IPOs where control is concentrated in the hands of 
management. Previous research was rarely concerned with the per-share voting rights 
o f the stock being offered or other corporate-govemance provisions that might impact 
the value or liquidity of the shares offered. This study explicitly considers the 
implications of differential voting power and control on firm value, post-IPO 
performance, insider trading, and stock liquidity.
To assess performance and liquidity differences that are due to the firm’s 
ownership structure, a control sample of single-class IPOs is created that is matched to
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the dual-class by exchange, firm size, industry, and time of offering. Upon comparing 
dual-class and control group performance for different exchanges, this study finds that 
for both NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ, single-class control IPOs significantly 
underperform dual-class IPOs in stock-price performance during the three years 
following the offering. Furthermore, using various accounting cash-flow measures of 
operating performance, dual-class IPOs on average are twice as profitable as single­
class IPOs. The evidence leads to the conclusion that a dual-class equity structure for 
IPOs has net benefits resulting, ceteris paribus, in reduced underpricing, improved 
stock-price and operating performance, and increased value of the firm’s stock. 
Although such mechanism reduces the threat of hostile takeovers, managerial decisions 
do not go undisciplined. Moreover, benefits from such contract appear to outweigh the 
agency costs that may be engendered. The founders retain at least 49% of the cash­
flow claim while diluting the firm by 27.21% and retaining more than 68% of the 
voting control, and are thereby subject to the ex-post wealth consequences of their own 
decisions.
This study further examines the liquidity characteristics of IPOs with dual-class 
and single-class common stock structures. It attempts to test the hypothesis concerning 
the impact of a dual-class common stock structure upon several liquidity measures. The 
results of the analysis strongly suggest that there are net benefits to a dual-class equity 
structure for IPOs that stem from microstructure considerations. A direct result is the 
mitigation of the adverse selection problem facing uninformed traders at the time of 
going public resulting, ceteris paribus, in improved liquidity. The study finds that
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during the entire 250-day aftermarket period, dual-class IPOs experience significantly 
smaller spreads, lower volatility , smaller average trade size and higher turnover ratios 
compared to the single-class firms. The results are not sensitive to the time frame used 
for aggregating data and hence the differences persist and remain significant throughout 
the sample study period irrespective of whether the analyses are performed on a 
weekly, monthly, quarterly or yearly basis.
The overall evidence in this study as well as the comments obtained from dual­
class firm managers suggest that financing and diversification constraints of owner- 
managers may induce them to sell external equity to take advantage o f investment 
opportunities while still retaining control. In particular, a dual-class framework 
provides increased incentives for managers to invest in organization-specific human 
capital since the likelihood that returns to such investment will be expropriated is 
considerably reduced. In many cases it ensures continued family involvement in the 
long-term interests of the firm, even after the death of the founder. Furthermore, it 
allows considerable freedom to the founder (usually also the CEO) to stabilize and steer 
the company in the desired direction. Comments obtained from dual-class firm CEOs 
suggest that some of the founders of these firms have spent their lives building the 
firms with all or most of their money at stake, and now do not wish to lose them to 
corporate raiders with short-term interests. The founders have long-term vested 
interests and have a vision for their firms. The IPO exposes the firms to a new legal 
and operating environment that includes the harsh competitive market for corporate 
control. The founders thus found it appropriate to adopt a dual-class equity structure
at the time of IPO to ward off all unsolicited external interferences in the attainment of 
firm goals. A dual-class choice has net benefits for such firms that derive from both 
governance and market microstructure considerations, as documented in this 
dissertation.
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Appendix A
D ata Available
The following data has been collected for the 98 dual as well as single-class (control
group) firms:
1. Issuer name
2. Description of the Business (SIC code)
3. Exchange on which trading (if listed)
4. Offer date
5. Offer amount
6. Offer price per share
7. Shares offered (Primary, Secondary, and Total)
8. Dilution percentage
9. Fully diluted Price/Earnings ratio
10. Market value after offer
11. Market/Book ratio after offer
12. Gross underwriting spread as percentage of price
13. Gross underwriting spread breakdown between management and underwriting 
fees
14. Managing underwriters
15. Stock price filing range (low and high)
16. Total shares filed
17. Latest twelve month revenues prior to offer date
18. Latest twelve month net income prior to offer date
19. Audited Earnings/Share figures for up to 5 years prior to offer date
The following information has been collected for all firms for each year-end
following the IPO until June 1992:
20. Authorized number of class A (inferior voting right) shares
21. Number of class A shares outstanding and publicly traded
22. Par value of class A shares
23. Number of class A shareholders
24. Authorized number of class B (superior voting right) shares
25. Number of class B shares outstanding and closely held (not traded)
26. Par value of class B shares
27. Number o f class B shareholders
28. Total long-term debt outstanding (including revolving credit)
29. Bank debt (including lines of credit)
30. Number of employees
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31. Voting power distribution(class A firms belong to one of the 4 classes: non 
voting, pooled voting (shares with fractional voting rights), class voting (shares 
that are allowed to vote for only a minority of directors), or both pooled and 
class voting)
32. Relative voting power of classes of stock - Class A: Class B (firms belong to any
one of the 10 classes: 0:1, 1:1, 1:2, 1:3, 1:4, 1:5, 1:10, 1:20, 1:30, 1:500. For
Class voting it is 1:1)
33. Percentage of total voting control closely held
34. Number of insiders controlling the voting power in number 33
35. Number and percentage o f shares held by officers and directors
36. Number of shares held by institutions
37. Number of institutional holders
38. Percentage of shares held by institutions
39. Shares owned by 5% blockholders
40. Number of 5% blockholders
41. Percentage of shares held by 5% blockholders
42. Insider shareholdings
43. Number of insiders
44. Percentage of shares held by insiders
Information has also been obtained whether firms merged, got acquired, went 
private again, changed their names, or filed for Chapter 11. Furthermore, 
information is being collected on share repurchases and capitalization changes 
by any o f the sample firms.
Appendix B
Criteria for Matching Control Sample
The matching firms for the dual-class IPOs are identified from among the long 
run single-class IPO sample between 1984 and 1988. Four essential criteria (in order 
o f priority) have been kept in mind while establishing the control group:
1) The matching firm trades on the same exchange on which its dual-class 
contemporary trades.
2) The offer date for the matching firm is within 60 days of the offer date of the 
dual-class firm.
3) The matching firm belongs to the same industry (4 digit code or at least 3 digit 
code) as the dual-class firm.
4) The market value for the matching firm at the close of the first trading day is 
close to that of the dual-class firm (classes A and B combined, assuming that 
class B trades at the same price as class A).
The four-digit SIC codes are obtained for all firms using any one or more of the 
following sources: 1) 1991 CRSP, 2) IDD, 3) 1991 Compustat, 4) Million Dollar 
Directory, and 4) S&P Register of Corporations.
The industry groups are classified as:
0100-0900 Agriculture
1000-1400 Mining
1500-1700 Construction
2000-3900 Manufacturing
4000-4900 Transport/Electric/Gas/Sanitary Services
5000-5100 Wholesale trade
5200-5900 Retail Trade
6000-6700 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
7000-8900 Services
9100-9700 Public Administration
9900- Nonclassifiable Establishments
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Appendix C
Industry Profile of Dual-Class IPOs
The following is a description of business of the 118 dual-class firms from 1984-1990.
1 BIOLOGICAL PRODUCT RESEARCH 60 MNFR PRINTING PRESS EQUIPMENT
2 BANK HOLDING COMPANY 61 COMMUNICATION HOLDING CO
3 FINANCIAL APPLICATION SOFTWARE 62 PIPE/SEWER/CONDUIT REPAIR
4 MNFR/MKT PHARMACEUTICALS 63 OPERATE SHOWCASE CLUBS
5 MNFR MICROWAVE EQUIP/SYSTEMS 64 DISABILITY INSURANCE
6 COMMERCIAL BANK 65 MNFR PRINTING MACHINES/EQUIP
7 MNFR ADHESIVE PRODUCTS 66 MNFR/MRKT UNDERWEAR
8 SAVINGS BANK 67 ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING
9 OPERATE HEALTH CARE FACILITIES 68 RETAIL FUR APPAREL
10 MNFR AUTOMOTIVE PARTS 69 OPER WOMEN’S APPAREL STORES
11 MNFR TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIP 70 EXPLORE/DVLP GOLD MINES
12 MNFR MENS/BOYS SPORTSHIRTS 71 BANK HOLDING COMPANY
13 BANK HOLDING COMPANY 72 PACKAGE/DIST/MRKT COSMETICS
14 MNFR SPECIALTY FURNITURE 73 MRKT/DIST AUTO ACCESSORIES
15 MNFR CASUAL/CHILDREN CLOTHING 74 PRODUCES FLEXIBLE PACKAGING
16 REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST 75 MNFR MENS & WOMENS SHOES
17 SAVINGS & LOAN 76 OPERATES CRUISE SHIPS
18 MFR/MRKT TELCOM EQUIP/SOFTWARE 77 MNFR HYDRAULIC EQUIPMENT
19 OPERATE RESORTS 78 LIFE/ACCIDENT/HEALTH INSURANCE
20 MNFR/MRKT MOTOR VEHICLES 79 GROW/SELL CRANBERRIES
21 OPERATE CHILD CARE CENTERS 80 CELLULAR TELEPHONE SERVICE
22 IN VITRO FERTILITY SERVICES 81 FURNITURE/INSURANCE HOLDING CO
23 OPERATE HEALTH CARE FACILITIES 82 MNFR CIRCUIT SYSTEMS
24 OPERATE SELF-SERVICE STORES 83 GROCERY RETAILING
25 CABLE TELEVISION 84 CABLE TELEVISION SERVICE
26 BANK HOLDING COMPANY 85 ENGINEERING SOFTWARE/SERVICES
27 SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION 86 MNFR PAPER MACHINE CLOTHING
28 PROVIDE INVESTMENT SERVICES 87 ENGINEERING CONSULTING FIRM
29 CABLE TELEVISION 88 CATALOG GENERAL MERCHANDISE
30 CABLE TELEVISION SYSTEMS 89 MNFR RECREATIONAL & INK PRODS
31 OPERATE BUSINESS SCHOOL 90 REGIONAL NEWSPAPER PUBLISHER
32 BANK HOLDING COMPANY 91 MNFR AUTOMOBILE MIRRORS/GLASS
33 CABLE TELEVISION HOLDING CO 92 CELLULAR TELEPHONE SERVICE
34 PROV DATA PROCESSING SERVICES 93 CELLULAR TELEPHONE SERVICE
35 DVLP/MRKT DATABASE SYSTEM 94 COPPER/GOLD/SILVER MINING
36 OWN/OPER RADIO STATIONS 95 ART AUCTIONEER/LUXURY REALTOR
37 BANK HOLDING COMPANY 96 WHOLESALE FOOD DISTRIBUTOR
38 DISTR ELECTRONIC/VIDEO PRODUCT 97 REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST
39 MNFR/RETAIL JEWELRY 98 BONE MARROW RESEARCH
40 BANK HOLDING COMPANY 99 MNFR PAPER PRODUCTS
41 RETAIL WOMENS APPAREL 100 DIVERSIFIED MEDIA COMPANY
42 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTING 101 OWNS/OPER STEEL MILLS
43 MRKT SPECIALTY ICE-CREAM 102 OWN/OPER TV/RADIO STATIONS
44 OPER COGENERATION FACILTY 103 OFFICE SUPPLY STORES
45 DVLP/PRODUCE TELEVISION PROG 104 PROVIDE AGRICULTURAL LOANS
46 OPER CABLE TELEVISION SYSTEMS 105 PROVIDE AGRICULTURAL LOANS
47 OPER CABLE TELEVISION SYSTEMS 106 MNFR/MKT MEN’S SPORTSWEAR
48 SAVINGS & LOAN HOLDING COMPANY 107 DISTRIBUTE TV PROGRAMS
49 MNFR/MRKT WATER VALVES 108 OPERATES SUPERMARKET CHAIN
50 BANK HOLDING COMPANY 109 ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
51 OPERATE MOVIE THEATERS 110 PUBLISHING COMPANY
52 DVLP SOFTWARE/PRODUCTS 111 AUTO PARTS STORES
53 INVESTMENT MNGT HOLDING CO 112 RETAIL OFFICE SUPPLIES
54 REAL ESTATE COMPANY 113 MNFR COMPOSITE BLDG MATERIAL
55 PROV MANAGEMENT SERVICES 114 CELLULAR PHONE SYSTEMS
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56 OWN/OPER T.V. SYSTEMS
57 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
58 OPER CONVEENCE STORES
59 OPER RETAIL HOME HEAT COMPANY
115 CAPITAL EQUIPMENT LEASES
116 ENVIRON & ENGINEER SERVICES
117 EXPL/DEV NATURAL GAS
118 INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANY
Appendix D
Comments from Dual-Class Firm CEOs/CFOs
The following excerpts are taken from some of the letters received from CEOs of dual­
class firms stating their motivations for adopting a dual-class equity structure.
"The reason for creating two classes of stock is fairy simple. You 
will note from the proxy statement that holders of Class A common are 
entitled to one vote per share, while Class B has greater voting power - five 
per share. Mr. X, who founded the Company, retains all of the Class B 
common stock. Two classes of stock enabled the Company to put a 
substantial amount of stock into the original float - 27 million shares - but 
still retain 80% of the voting control through the ownership of Class B. You 
will note from our annual report that last year we earned approximately 
$282 million. That is more than four-and-a half times the earnings of our 
nearest competitor which earned approximately $60 million in 1992."
"At the time we went public our licensor owned 25% of the 
Company. My family and I owned approximately 45% of the Company.
Under the then current estate tax structure, my family’s interest would 
reduce to approximately 20% after my death, whereas our licensor, being 
a corporation, would never have to pay an estate tax and would never 
reduce its holding. Therefore, in order to protect against an ultimate change 
of control to our licensor the dual-class stock structure was enacted, all of 
which was known to the public purchasing our stock."
"The primary reason for the different classes of stock is to insure 
that Mr. X controls the Company. Mr. X put together the capital structure 
in 1987 to purchase the Company. Even though Mr. X controls the 
Company, his super voting rights end with the sale of his shares. Thus, all 
shares, whether A, B, or C have equal economic rights."
"For many years until the mid-1980’s, the Company had been a 
family owned Company whose chief executive officer was a member o f the 
controlling family. In 1985, the Company hired an outside executive to be 
chief operating officer, which was the first step away from family 
management. At the time of the IPO, the family was not yet ready to turn 
over complete control to this new management. In 1988, in a follow-up 
step, a nominating committee arrangement coupled with a trust management 
with a four-year life, which provided for the conversion o f all stock into one 
class at the end of the four year period was finalized."
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"The major reason for dual-class voting on the initial offering was 
to assure the founders of the Company a significant input in the future of 
the Company as a public entity. The founders had significant background 
in our industry and a clear long term strategy for the Company. Raising 
capital in the public markets enabled the Company to advance toward those 
goals at a faster pace. As the Company develops and reaches those initial 
goals, it was anticipated that additional capital would be required to reach 
new long term goals. The initial class voting difference guaranteed the 
ability of the founders to carry out the original plans without fear of a take 
over threat. Basically, the only holders of three-vote stock were the original 
founders of the Company with virtually the majority of their individual net 
worth invested in the Company. We were long term investors, not short 
term profit takers. Since the initial offering, several original long term goals 
have been achieved and we successfully completed an offering in August of 
1992. That offering effectively diluted the effect of the high vote stock by 
about 20%. In conclusion, the high vote stock provided a mechanism to 
guarantee the "entrepreneurs" that started the Company the ability to reach 
initial long term goals without undue outside influence."
"To maintain voting control of the corporation. The Company has 
been family owned and the family is still active in Company operations. 
Dual-class was appropriate in maintaining control and providing a diversity 
of public holders who all purchased the IPO with an understanding of the 
voting situation and control issues."
"The chairman wished to retain control of the Company. In the early 
1980s, we had seen the disastrous consequences of one of our largest 
competitors being taken over and badly managed. Our Company’s roots go 
back almost 100 years, and I believe the chairman felt it was in the best 
interests of both the employees and our customers if  control remained with 
Class B shareholders. You should note that people who own B stock cannot 
profit at the expense of A shareholders by selling it at a "premium." In 
order for B stock to be sold, it must be transferred to A stock prior to sale. 
The only significant exception is transfers within a family."
"Our Company had been a privately held company from 1874 to 
1986. The primary purpose of the two classes of equity with differential 
voting rights was to preserve the management control within the Company. 
It is expected that the voting rights of the Class B common stock may make 
the company less attractive as the potential target o f a hostile tender offer 
or other proposal to acquire the stock or business of the Company, and 
merger proposals might be rendered more difficult, even if such actions 
would be in the best interests of the holders of the Class A common stock. 
Accordingly, increases in the market price of the Class A common stock,
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temporary or otherwise, which might result from actual or rumored hostile 
takeover attempts, will be inhibited."
"Our Company is an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of X Inc. 
which holds approximately 83% of the outstanding shares of Class A 
common stock, and all of the outstanding shares of Class B common stock, 
and through its ability to elect all directors of the company, indirectly 
controls all matters relating to the management of our Company. X Inc. 
recently formed our Company in connection with a reorganization of its oil 
and gas business. The reorganization and financial restructuring (including 
the offerings) were undertaken (i) to enable X Inc. to realize a return of a 
portion of its investment in our Company through the elimination of 
intercompany accounts and the distribution to X Inc. of a special $140 
million dividend, (ii) to enable our Company to have direct access to capital 
markets, (iii) to establish a market value for X Inc.’s equity interest in our 
Company, and (iv) to create a structure in which our company would be 
better able to compete and expand."
"The recapitalization through the charter amendment, combined with 
the results of the exchange offer, have the effect of permitting the "X" 
Family to elect the entire board of directors, and to determine the outcome 
of any other matters submitted to the stockholders for approval, including 
a merger or sale of substantially all of the assets of the Company. The 
aggregate voting power of the "X" Family is also likely to discourage any 
proposed takeover of the Company pursuant to a tender offer unless the 
terms thereof are approved by the "X" Family. The Company presently 
believes the "X" Family would vote together on any significant corporate 
matters effecting the management or ownership of the Company. The 
Company is unable to predict what effect, if  any, the voting control o f the 
"X" Family will have on the market price of the Class A common stock."
"We created a dual-class equity structure to provide preferential 
rights to the public shareholders with regard to the payment of dividends, 
and liquidation rights. This was to enhance the marketability o f the shares 
being offered to the public in the IPO. Please note that since May 1, 1993 
(marking the end of the preference period), the Class A and Class B 
common stock are identical in all respects."
"The principal purpose of the Reclassification was to provide the 
Company with a more flexible financial structure to facilitate raising 
additional equity or to make acquisitions without significantly diluting the 
voting power of existing stockholders, particularly members of the family 
of "X". One effect will be to enable the "X" family to maintain practical 
control over the Company’s affairs as long as family members do not
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dispose of significant amounts o f their Class B common stock. With the sale 
of the 1,300,000 shares of Class A common offered through the IPO, the 
outstanding common stock of the Company (both classes) was increased by 
approximately 53% while the voting power of the Class B common holders 
was diminished by 7.6%."
"The Company’s voting structure, which is similar to voting 
structures adopted by a number of other media companies, was designed to 
promote the continued independence and integrity of the Company’s media 
operations under the control o f the holders of the Class B Voting Stock 
while at the same time providing for equity ownership in the Company by 
a broader group of stockholders through the means of a class of publicly- 
traded common stock. This structure renders more difficult certain 
unsolicited or hostile attempts to take over the Company which would 
disrupt the Company, divert the attention of its Directors, officers and 
employees and adversely affect the independence and quality of its media 
operations. The holders of Class B Voting Stock have the power to defeat 
any attempt to acquire control of the Company with a view to effecting a 
merger, sale of assets or similar transaction even though such a change in 
control may be favored by stockholders holding substantially more than a 
majority of the Company’s outstanding equity. This may have the effect of 
precluding holders of shares in the Company from receiving any premium 
above market price for their shares in connection with any such attempt to 
acquire control."
"The Reclassification was implemented principally to facilitate, in the 
event the Company were to be sold, the negotiation of the best sale price for 
all stockholders. Because shares of Class B common stock are not 
transferable except to permitted transferees, holders of Class B common 
stock, in connection with any sale of the Company, will be able to sell only 
the Class A common stock into which such shares o f Class B common stock 
are convertible and, thus, will not be able to obtain consideration for the 
Class B common stock greater than that paid to holders of Class A stock."
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